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I.   INTRODUCTION
No lesson seems to be so deeply inculcated by the experience of life as
that you should never trust experts. If you believe the doctors, nothing
is wholesome; if you believe the theologians, nothing is innocent; if
you believe the soldiers, nothing is safe. They all require to have their
strong wine diluted by a very large admixture of insipid common
sense.1
Lord Salisbury
Psychological testimony based upon the examination of a defendant in
the penalty phase of a capital case is critical. If a mentally impaired de-
fendant presents such testimony, it can save his life. If the State fails to
rebut such testimony, even an unimpaired serial killer can escape the
death penalty.
The State is unfairly prejudiced in the penalty phase of a capital prose-
cution if only the defendant is able to introduce mental health evidence in
the form of psychiatric and psychological expert testimony relying on a
clinical examination of the accused. In such cases, psychiatrists and psy-
chologists may testify to their opinions and, additionally, testify as to
statements, observations, and tests of the accused that form bases for the
experts’ opinions. If the accused has elected to invoke his Fifth Amend-
ment right not to testify against himself at trial and the prosecutor has no
access to him for psychiatric testing, the State’s ability to rebut the mental
health testimony will be severely hampered and the State’s interest in en-
suring the reliability of its evidence is likely to be compromised.
The Florida Supreme Court, in an attempt to put the State in a position
to rebut mental health testimony, has recently enacted Florida Rule of
Criminal Procedure 3.202.2 This Rule establishes specific procedures by
which the State can rebut the defense’s psychological testimony. Specifi-
cally, it authorizes courts to order a defendant to be examined by the
State’s doctors.3 If a defendant refuses to be examined by the State’s
doctors, the Rule authorizes the court to preclude the defendant’s own
medical experts from testifying about their examination of the defendant,
although the experts may testify hypothetically.4 Without question, this
preclusion sanction will be effective as a means of ensuring the State an
opportunity to respond to a defendant’s expert testimony. But, is preclu-
sion constitutional?
The United States Supreme Court has been inconsistent in its rulings
on the constitutionality of preclusion of defense evidence. The Court has
                                                                                                         
1. OXFORD DICTIONARY OF QUOTATIONS 554 (4th ed. 1992).
2. The Rule became effective January 1, 1996. FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.202, editor’s note.
3. See FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.202(d).
4. See infra notes 65-71 and accompanying text.
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held that the accused does have a constitutional right to present defense
witnesses and that a capital defendant has an almost unlimited right to
present defense mitigation evidence.5 Pursuant to these holdings, the
Court has reversed several trial court decisions in which the State used its
procedural or evidentiary rules to exclude defense evidence in capital
cases.6 However, the Court also has upheld defense evidence exclusions
based upon the State’s need to ensure compliance with the established
rules of evidence and procedure designed to assure both fairness and reli-
ability in the ascertainment of guilt and innocence.7
Although Rule 3.202(e)’s preclusion sanction has not yet faced a con-
stitutional challenge because of its recent enactment, it will be challenged
for at least two reasons. First, Rule 3.202(e) is the first penalty phase re-
ciprocal examination/preclusion rule of its kind in the country. Second,
the Rule permits trial judges to exclude penalty-phase defense expert tes-
timony regarding mitigating factors.
This Article discusses the constitutionality of Rule 3.202(e)’s preclu-
sion sanction in light of the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence. Part II of this
Article presents the background of Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure
3.202 and justification for the Rule. This part demonstrates that the State
needs to conduct its own examination of a capital defendant if it is effec-
tively to rebut the defense’s mental health mitigation testimony. Part III
discusses in detail Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.202 and how the
Rule’s preclusion sanction ensures the State’s examination of the accused
in a capital case. Part IV discusses alternative sanctions less severe than
preclusion and demonstrates that those alternative sanctions would be in-
effective in ensuring the State’s examination of the defendant. Part V dis-
cusses the constitutionality of Rule 3.202(e)’s preclusion sanction and ar-
gues that under existing United States Supreme Court precedent, the
Rule’s constitutionality should be sustained to ensure the reliability of
penalty-phase mental health testimony.
II.   BACKGROUND AND JUSTIFICATION FOR THE RULE
A.   An Overview of the Penalty Phase
Once a defendant is convicted of first degree murder in a capital case,
the penalty or sentencing phase begins. In this phase, the judge deter-
mines  (after the recommendation of the jury, if there is one) whether the
                                                                                                         
5. Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586 (1978); see also infra notes 281-82 and accompanying
text.
6. See, e.g., Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 302 (1973); see also infra notes
284-306 and accompanying text.
7. See infra part V.B.
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defendant is sentenced to life imprisonment or death.8 Florida, along with
every other death penalty state, conducts first degree murder trials in
capital cases in two phases.9 Guilt or innocence is decided in the first
phase. If a guilty verdict of first degree murder is returned, the same
judge or jury who heard the guilt phase hears the penalty phase.10 During
the penalty phase, Florida and thirty-four of the thirty-six other death
penalty states use a statutory system of aggravating and mitigating fac-
tors.11 Under this system, the State first presents its evidence relevant to
the aggravating factors.12 Then, the defendant presents evidence relevant
to statutorily enumerated mitigating factors.13
                                                                                                         
8. The “majority of capital punishment jurisdictions vest the life-or-death decision ex-
clusively in the jury. In many states, a death sentence may be imposed only if the jury unani-
mously agrees that death is the appropriate punishment. Nonetheless, in three states—Alabama,
Florida, and Indiana—the trial judge may overrule [override] the jury and impose a death sen-
tence, even if all jurors voted for a life sentence.” RANDALL COYNE & LYN ENTZEROTH,
CAPITAL PUNISHMENT AND THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 404 (1994); see also LaTour R. Lafferty,
Florida’s Capital Sentencing Jury Override: Whom Should We Trust To Make the Ultimate
Ethical Judgment?, 23 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 463 (1995). The constitutionality of Florida’s jury
override provision was upheld in Spaziano v. Florida, 468 U.S. 447 (1984).
9. All capital punishment states provide for separation of a capital trial into two phases:
guilt/nonguilt and sentencing. See ALA. CODE § 13A-5-45(a) (1994); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-
703 B. (Supp. 1995); ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-4-602(3) (1993); CAL. PENAL CODE § 190.05(e)
(West 1988) (requiring two phases only if defendant served a prior prison term); COLO. REV.
STAT. § 16-11-103(1)(a) (Supp. 1995); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53a-46a(b) (West 1994);
DEL. CODE. ANN. tit. 11, § 4209(b)(1) (1995); FLA. STAT. § 921.141(1) (1995); GA. CODE
ANN. §§ 17-10-1(a), 17-10-3(a) (Supp. 1990); IDAHO CODE § 19-2515(e) (Supp. 1995); ILL.
ANN. STAT. ch. 38, para. 9-1(d) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1992) (allowing separate hearing only
when requested by the State); IND. CODE ANN. §35-50-2-9(d) (Burns Supp. 1995); KY. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 532.025(1)(a)-(b) (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1990); LA. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN.
art. 905(A) (West Supp. 1996); MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 413(a) (Supp. 1995); MISS. CODE
ANN. § 99-19-101(1) (1994); MO. ANN. STAT. § 565.030.4 (Vernon Supp. 1996); MONT. CODE
ANN. § 46-18-301 (1995); NEB. REV. STAT. § 29-2520 (1989); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 175.552
(Michie Supp. 1995); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 630:5.II (Supp. 1995); N.J. STAT. ANN. §
2C:11-3(c)(1) (1995); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 31-20A-1.B (Michie 1994); N.C. GEN. STAT. §
15A-2000(a)(1) (Supp. 1995); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2929.03(D)(1) (Anderson Supp.
1995); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 701.10.A (West Supp. 1996); OR. REV. STAT. §
163.150(1)(a) (Supp. 1994); 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 9711(a)(1) (1982); S.C. CODE ANN.
§ 16-3-20(B) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1995); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 23A-27A-2 (Supp.
1995); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-13-204(a) (Supp. 1995); TEX. CRIM. PROC. CODE ANN. art.
37.071.2(a) (West Supp. 1996); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-3-207(1) (Supp. 1995); VA. CODE ANN. §
19.2-264.4.A  (Michie 1995); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 10.95.050(1) (West 1990); WYO. STAT. §
6-2-102(a) (Supp. 1995); see also Robert A. Kelly, Applicability of the Rules of Evidence to
the Capital Sentencing Proceeding: Theoretical & Practical Support for Open Admissibility of
Mitigating Information, 60 UMKC L. REV. 411, 411 (1992).
10. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 921.141(l) (1995).
11. This system is based on the Model Penal Code. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.6
(Proposed Official Draft 1962); see, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-703 (Supp. 1995);
COLO. REV. STAT. § 16-11-103 (Supp. 1995); FLA. STAT. § 921.141 (1995).
12. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 921.141(5) (1995), which provides the following:
(5) AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCES.—Aggravating circumstances shall be
limited to the following:
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Three of Florida’s statutory mitigating factors relate to a defendant’s
aberrant mental state.14 Because a defendant has the federal constitutional
                                                                                                         
(a) The capital felony was committed by a person under sentence of imprisonment
or placed on community control.
(b) The defendant was previously convicted of another capital felony or of a felony
involving the use or threat of violence to the person.
(c) The defendant knowingly created a great risk of death to many persons.
(d) The capital felony was committed while the defendant was engaged, or was an
accomplice, in the commission of, or an attempt to commit, or flight after commit-
ting or attempting to commit, any robbery, sexual battery, aggravated child abuse,
arson, burglary, kidnapping, or aircraft piracy or the unlawful throwing, placing, or
discharging of a destructive device or bomb.
(e) The capital felony was committed for the purpose of avoiding or preventing a
lawful arrest or effecting an escape from custody.
(f) The capital felony was committed for pecuniary gain.
(g) The capital felony was committed to disrupt or hinder the lawful exercise of any
governmental function or the enforcement of laws.
(h) The capital felony was especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel.
(i) The capital felony was a homicide and was committed in a cold, calculated, and
premeditated manner without any pretense of moral or legal justification.
(j) The victim of the capital felony was a law enforcement officer engaged in the
performance of his official duties.
(k) The victim of the capital felony was an elected or appointed public official en-
gaged in the performance of his official duties if the motive for the capital felony was
related, in whole or in part, to the victim’s official capacity.
(l) The victim of the capital felony was a person less than 12 years of age.
13. See, e.g., id. § 921.141 (6), which provides:
(6) MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCES.—Mitigating circumstances shall be the
following:
(a) The defendant has no significant history of prior criminal activity.
(b) The capital felony was committed while the defendant was under the influence
of extreme mental or emotional disturbance.
(c) The victim was a participant in the defendant’s conduct or consented to the act.
(d) The defendant was an accomplice in the capital felony committed by another
person and his participation was relatively minor.
(e) The defendant acted under extreme duress or under the substantial domination
of another person.
(f) The capacity of the defendant to appreciate the criminality of his conduct or to
conform his conduct to the requirements of law was substantially impaired.
(g) The age of the defendant at the time of the crime.
14. See id. § 921.141(6)(b), (e), (f). Other states also specify statutory mitigating factors
related to the defendant’s mental state. See ALA. CODE § 13A-5-51(2), (5), (6) (1994); ARIZ.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-703 G.1 (1995); ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-4-605(1), (3) (1993); CAL.
PENAL CODE § 190.3(d), (h) (West 1988); COLO. REV. STAT. § 16-11-103(4)(b), (f) (Supp.
1995); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53a-46a(g)(2) (West 1994); IND. CODE ANN. § 35-50-2-
9(c)(2), (6) (Burns Supp. 1995); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 532.025(2)(b)2., 6., 7.
(Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1990); LA. ANN. § 905.5(b), (e) (West 1986 & Supp. 1991); MD.
ANN. CODE art. 27, § 413(g)(3), (4) (Supp. 1995); MISS. CODE ANN. § 99-19-101(6)(b), (f)
(1994); MO. ANN. STAT. § 565.032.3(2), (6) (Vernon Supp. 1996); MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-
18-304(1)(b), (d) (1995); NEB. REV. STAT. § 29-2523 (2)(c), (g) (1989); N.C. GEN. STAT. §
15A-2000 (f)(2), (6) (Supp. 1995); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 630:5VI(a), (b), (f) (Supp.
1995); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:11-3c., (5)a., d. (1995); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 31-20A-6.C., D.
(Michie 1994); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2929.04(B)(3) (Anderson 1993); OR. REV. STAT. §
163.150(1)(c)(A) (Supp. 1994); 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 9711(e)(2), (3) (1982); S.C.
CODE ANN. § 16-3-20(C)(b)(2), (6) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1995); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-3-
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right to present, in the penalty phase of a capital case, anything that might call
for a sentence other than death,15 mental health mitigating evidence must be
admitted.
Furthermore, if the State fails to rebut the mitigating factors, they are
deemed established.16 Although it is not a strict counting game, if the State
can establish only one aggravating circumstance and the defendant can estab-
lish the three mental health mitigating factors, the defendant will likely avoid
the death sentence.17
B.   The Defense Examination of Capital Defendants
To establish the three mental health mitigating factors in the penalty phase
of a capital case in Florida, the defendant’s doctors will first examine him.18
The doctors will record some of the defendant’s statements and behaviors and
administer psychological tests to the defendant.19 Defense doctors then can
testify at trial that, based upon their examination, the defendant meets one or
more of the mental health mitigating factors listed in the statute.20 If the ex-
perts testify during the penalty phase but the defendant does not, the defense
can gain a tactical advantage because defense counsel can use the expert as a
conduit to tell the defendant’s story to the court.21 This set of circumstances
allows defense counsel to substitute a professional mental health witness for a
poor or inexperienced witness and allows the defendant to avoid cross-
examination.
C.   The Questionable Reliability of Mental Health Testimony
There are two problems affecting the reliability of mental health testi-
mony. The first is that mental health testimony may be biased or inaccurate.22
                                                                                                         
207(2)(b), (d) (Supp. 1995); VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-264.4.B.(ii), (iv), (vi) (Michie 1995);
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 10.95.070(2), (6) (West Supp. 1996); WYO. STAT. § 6-2-
102(j)(ii), (vi) (Supp. 1995).
15. See infra notes 281-82; see also John Kaplan, Lecture, Evidence in Capital Cases, 11
FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 369, 371 (1983) (stating that “Chief Justice Burger, for a four-justice
plurality, held that a state cannot constitutionally prevent the sentencer from ‘considering any
aspect of the defendant’s character and record or any circumstances of his offense as an inde-
pendently mitigating factor.’” (quoting Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 606 (1977)).
16. Dillbeck v. State, 643 So. 2d 1027, 1030 (Fla. 1994) (quoting Nibert v. State, 574
So. 2d 1059, 1062 (Fla. 1990)).
17. Telephone Interview with David R. Parry, Chief Assistant Public Defender, Clearwater,
Fla. (Jan. 25, 1996) [hereinafter Parry Interview].
18. Telephone Interview with Barry Cobb, Chief Assistant Public Defender, Clearwater,
Fla. (July 5, 1996) [hereinafter Cobb Interview].
19. See infra notes 30-36 and accompanying text.
20. Parry Interview, supra note 17.
21. See infra notes 216-18 and accompanying text.
22. See United States v. Byers, 740 F.2d 1104, 1168 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
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The second is that the clinical interview, the predicate for all mental
health testimony, is frequently invalid.23
Four attributes of the mental health professionals who conduct clinical
interviews may affect the reliability and validity of their examination re-
sults: (1) they belong to a science that is “inexact and uncertain”;24 (2)
they subscribe to “widely different theoretical positions”;25 (3) they are
subject to personal and institutional biases;26 and (4) they cannot answer
forensic27 questions with any reasonable degree of accuracy.28
A clinical interview constitutes three realities, each of which may be
subject to errors in reliability. First, it is an event; second, it is an inter-
action; and third, it is a test.29
First, the clinical interview is a complex behavioral meeting in which
the accused may exhibit evidence of important clinical behaviors.30 The
                                                                                                         
23. See id.
24. See id. at 1167 (Bazelon, J., dissenting) (citation omitted) (“[P]sychiatry is at best an
inexact science, if, indeed, it is a science, lacking the coherent set of proven underlying values
necessary for ultimate decisions on knowledge or competence.”) (quoting Suggs v. LaVallee,
570 F.2d 1092, 1119 (2d Cir.) (Kaufman, J., concurring), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 915 (1978)).
This is not only the opinion of jurists, but also the opinion of scientists themselves. See, e.g., 1
JAY ZISKIN & DAVID FAUST, COPING WITH PSYCHIATRIC AND PSYCHOLOGICAL TESTIMONY
123 (4th ed. 1988) (quoting CALVIN S. HALL & GORDON LINDZEY, THEORIES OF PER-
SONALITY 72 (1957) (stating that “[p]sychology has a long way to go before it can be called an
exact science”); see also 1 ZISKIN & FAUST, supra, at 126 (quoting Joseph D. Mattarazzo,
Computerized Clinical Psychological Test Interpretations, 41 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 14, 20
(1986)) (stating that “[c]linical psychology today is still an art based on some scientific back-
ground and not a mature science . . . . Psychological Assessment is currently almost exclu-
sively the still-to-be-well-validated work of a legislatively sanctioned, clinician-artisan”).
25. Byers, 740 F.2d at 1167 (Bazelon, J., dissenting). The scientists themselves have ac-
knowledged their varying theoretical bases. See, e.g., 1 ZISKIN & FAUST, supra note 24, at
24.
The various personality theories differ widely in their overt and covert conception of
people and accordingly in their content and methodology . . . . Such diversion seems
to represent not only personality theory per se but psychology as a whole; this raises
the question as to the position of personality theory in the field of psychology.
Id. (quoting Jacob Lomranz, Personality Theory: Position and Derived Teaching Implications
in Clinical Psychology, 17 PROF. PSYCHOL.: RES. & PRAC. 551, 551 (1986)). These differ-
ences have made professionals question the validity of their science. See, e.g., id. at 26
(questioning the validity of Freudian-based psychoanalytical theory and stating that “[w]hat is
astounding is how little effort has been made to test the validity of our theories and how long
we have remained a shelter for bankrupt ideas”) (quoting Thomas Detre, The Future of Psy-
chiatry, 144 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 621, 622 (1987)).
26. Byers, 740 F.2d at 1167-68 (Bazelon, J., dissenting). Ziskin and Faust have collected
scientific authority on this subject and divided it into categories. See generally 1 ZISKIN &
FAUST, supra note 24.
27. In the context of this Article, this term pertains to the courtroom.
28. Mental health professionals have acknowledged, in scientific and professional litera-
ture, their difficulty in answering forensic questions. See generally 1 ZISKIN & FAUST, supra
note 24. Ziskin and Faust suggest several categories regarding these shortcomings. The cate-
gories include, inter alia, the dubious status of psychiatrists and psychologists as expert wit-
nesses, the elusive definition of normality, the contamination of data, and common deficiencies
in observing, recalling, reporting, and interpreting data. Id.
29. See Byers, 740 F.2d at 1168 (Bazelon, J., dissenting).
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examiner’s personal and institutional biases may affect the evaluation or
event in two ways. It may affect the examiner’s evaluation of the data he
or she collects, and it may affect the way in which behavior traits or
statements are perceived or misperceived, interpreted or misinterpreted,
noted or ignored.31 In addition, perceived facts can be distorted by the
clinician’s expectations, errors, and biases.32
Second, the clinical interview is a conversation between the examiner
and the accused. The examiner may ask certain questions, decline or ne-
glect to ask others, and follow up on certain questions but not others. The
examiner and the accused may, or may not, be of the same sex, race, and
class. These differing characteristics and questioning techniques may af-
fect how the accused answers the examiner’s questions.33
Third, the clinical interview may also include certain psychological
tests.34 Although the word “test” connotes validity, the reliability of some
                                                                                                         
30. Id. (citing PAUL H. HOCH, DIFFERENTIAL DIAGNOSIS IN CLINICAL PSYCHIATRY 19-
46 (M. Strahl & N. Lewis eds., 1972) and SEYMOUR B. SARASON, THE CLINICAL INTER-
ACTION 7-19 (1954)).
31. See id. at 1169 (citation omitted) (stating that “[o]ne of the clinician’s most revealing
experiences is to listen to a recording of his interaction with a patient. He becomes embarrass-
ingly aware of how much he forgot or was unconscious of, not only of the patient’s behavior
but of his own behavior as well”) (quoting SARASON, supra note 30, at 9 n.2); E.M. COLES,
CLINICAL PSYCHOPATHOLOGY 68-69 (1982) (stating that “[s]ome psychiatrists will reach a di-
agnostic conclusion within the first few minutes of the interview; and psychiatrists who en-
counter cues that don’t fit with their diagnostic conclusions are prone to misinterpret, misper-
ceive, and even ignore them”) (citation omitted); ROBERT ROSENTHAL, EXPERIMENTER
EFFECTS IN BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH 7 (1976) (stating that “[e]vents occurring in the clinical
interaction are often unobserved or at least unreported by the clinician”).
32. See ROSENTHAL, supra note 31, at 21 (stating that one variable shown to be espe-
cially likely to bias the assessment of behavior is expectancy of observer or interpreter);
SARASON, supra note 30, at 9 (finding evidence of differences among clinicians’ abilities to
describe reliably the overt actions of a patient).
33. See Byers, 740 F.2d at 1169 (Bazelon, J., dissenting); COLES, supra note 31, at 68;
see also H.A. STORROW, INTRODUCTION TO SCIENTIFIC PSYCHIATRY 76-78 (1967).
One can color what patients say without their knowing what’s being done. Even
worse, the doctor can do this without realizing it himself . . . . [In one study]
[a]pproval-seeking therapists discouraged angry talk by ignoring such remarks . . . .
Anger-expressing therapists were likely to do the opposite . . . . Patients encouraged
to go on in the same vein did so nine times out of ten; those who were discouraged
stopped their angry comments more than half the time.
STORROW, supra, at 76-78.
34. There are two broad categories of tests used in forensic examinations:
First, there are personality tests, which can be . . . divided into what are called
“objective” measures and “projective” measures. In essence, objective measures
contain relatively nonambiguous items (e.g., “I like science magazines”). Projective
measures contain ambiguous items (e.g., abstract inkblots that could look like any of
a number of things), and/or allow the respondent wide latitude in his answers or pro-
ductions (e.g., one draws a picture of a complete person in any manner they like).
The Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory (MMPI) is the most widely em-
ployed objective personality test. The Rorschach, the Thematic Appreciation Test,
the Bender Gestalt, and the Draw-A-Person Test are among the most widely used
projective “tests."
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of these tests is subject to dispute. The scientific literature indicates that
the results of even ostensibly objective parts of the clinical interview,
such as the projective personality tests, may be influenced by the ways in
which the tests are administered, interpreted, or scored.35 Experts indicate
that the “MMPI,” the most widely used objective personality test, may
not apply in the forensic setting.36
If defense mental health testimony is of questionable reliability, how is
such evidence made more reliable by introducing additional mental health
testimony from the prosecution? The answer lies in the nature of the ad-
versarial system. It is not that the defense mental health testimony is inac-
curate per se; rather, it is that because of defects in the science, the clini-
cal examination, and the testing, it may be inaccurate. As a consequence,
adversarial testing through the State’s own examination is a check on the
reliability and accuracy of the defense testimony. After hearing expert
testimony from both sides, the jury and judge will ultimately determine
reliability. As two medical doctors have stated, “The quintessential stan-
dard of quality for the expert witness is that his opinions be scientifically
and professionally plausible, reasonable, and sound; other equally sound
opinions could be drawn from the same data by other experts.”37
                                                                                                         
Second, there are tests that measure intellectual functions. Some of these are gen-
eral, or assess overall intellectual abilities. The Wechsler Intelligence scales are the
most widely employed for this purpose. There are also specialized tests designed
primarily to assess brain functioning or the potential effects of brain damage on par-
ticular intellectual functions, such as memory or reasoning. “Neuropsychological
tests” is the generic term for the more specialized tests designed for these purposes.
These neuropsychological tests may be combined into set combinations, or batteries.
The most popular of these are the Halstead-Reitan and the Luria-Nebraska Neurop-
sychological Battery.
2 JAY ZISKIN & DAVID FAUST, COPING WITH PSYCHIATRIC AND PSYCHOLOGICAL TESTIMONY
523, 535-36 (4th ed. 1988).
35. See 2 ZISKIN & FAUST, supra note 34, at 557 (noting the “lack of objectivity in
scoring projective tests,” and stating that “the final interpretation of projective test responses
may reveal more about the theoretical orientation, favorite hypotheses, and personality idio-
syncrasies of the examiner than it does about the examinee’s personality dynamics”) (quoting
ANNE ANASTASI, PSYCHOLOGICAL TESTING 582 (5th ed. 1982).
36. See Richard Rogers & William Seman, Murder and Criminal Responsibility: An Ex-
amination of MMPI Profiles, 1 BEHAV. SCI. & THE LAW 89, 89-90 (1983) (stating that “there
has been little systematic research on the utilization of psychological tests in the examination of
criminal forensic patients. From this perspective, Poythress (1979) indicated that standardized
psychological tests were not designed to address specific legal questions, and therefore, their
generalizability for this purpose has remained unestablished.”).
37. Richard R. Parlour & Lawrence R. Jones, The Role of the Defense Psychiatrist in
Workmen’s Compensation Cases, J. FORENSIC SCI. 535, 542 (1981). Drs. Parlour and Jones
set forth their opinion of the expert’s role in our adversary system:
Our legal system supposes that the truth best emerges in the adversary procedure es-
tablished by law. It further presumes that each party to a controversy can and will
present his position reasonably and effectively. Implicit is the principle that each side
is entitled to the most favorable, believable construction and representation of the
facts. Regardless of one’s personal philosophy about plaintiffs, defendants, govern-
ment, the insurance industry, the medical or legal profession, or any issue at stake in
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D.   Ineffectiveness of Cross-Examination of Defense Experts in Detecting
Unreliability of Defense Mental Health Testimony
Although the adversary system is able to ferret out the defects in reli-
ability of some evidence, commentators38 and the judiciary39 have ques-
tioned the effectiveness of cross-examination in exposing the unreliability
of testimony from mental health professionals. Many factors make cross-
examination of a mental health professional a poor means of illuminating
testimony defects to the jury;40 not the least of these factors is that the
methodology of clinical evaluations insulates the experts’ opinions from
reproach.41
E.   Ineffectiveness of Other Means of Validating Mental Health
Testimony in Ferreting out Unreliability
Prior to the promulgation of Rule 3.202, the Florida Supreme Court
allowed two procedures to help the State rebut mental health testimony.
According to the Florida Supreme Court, the “only avenue available for
the State to offer meaningful expert testimony to rebut the defense’s evi-
dence of mental mitigation” was to allow the State’s expert to remain in
the courtroom during the defense expert’s testimony.42 Exempting the
                                                                                                         
society, the litigants do not get their fair day in court if their cases are not optimally
presented.
Id. at 536.
38. See, e.g., Gary Melton, Expert Opinions: “Not for Cosmic Understanding,”
PSYCHOL. LITIG. & LEGIS. 59, 90 (1994) (stating that “[n]otwithstanding the historic assump-
tion in the law that cross-examination is an effective method for illuminating the weaknesses of
evidence, it is a poor means of showing the deficiencies (and strengths) of expert opinions”);
see also Stephen R. Smith, Mental Health Expert Witnesses: Of Science and Crystal Balls, 7
BEHAV. SCI. & LAW 145, 145-180 (1989) (commenting on the difficulty of cross-examination
in attacking the validity and reliability of clinical judgments).
39. See U.S. v. Byers, 740 F.2d, 1104, 1114 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (finding that, ordinarily,
the only effective way to rebut psychiatric opinion testimony is by contradictory opinion testi-
mony); State v. Hickson, 630 So. 2d 172, 176 (Fla. 1993) (holding that when a defense expert
will be used to demonstrate the presence of battered-spouse syndrome, the State will have the
opportunity to have its experts examine the defendant and present findings at trial to rebut ex-
pected expert testimony); Parkin v. State, 238 So. 2d 817, 821 (Fla. 1970), cert denied, 401
U.S. 974 (1971) (stating that “[i]llness, particularly mental illness, although often capable of
being proved by extrinsic evidence, is considered more susceptible to proof by evidence based
on interviews with the defendant and requiring his cooperation”).
40. See, e.g., Smith, supra note 38, at 164 (stating that jurors are ill-prepared to resolve
conflicting psychological theories and that attorneys often find it problematic to present validity
and reliability questions regarding mental health experts).
41. In overturning a conviction based in part on victim syndrome evidence, the New
Hampshire Supreme Court, in State v. Cressey, 628 A.2d 696 (N.H. 1993), noted that because
of the mental health expert’s methodology, her testimony was “effectively beyond reproach.”
Melton, supra note 38, at 90 (quoting Cressey, 628 A.2d at 701). Her testimony included in-
terpretation of many factors and, even if one of those factors were attacked, her overall opin-
ion would not be discredited. Id.; see also Smith, supra note 38, at 165.
42. Burns v. State, 609 So. 2d 600, 606 (Fla. 1992).
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State’s experts from the witness sequestration rule, the court allowed
them to remain in the courtroom while the defense experts testified be-
cause it was the only way for the State’s experts later to rebut the defense
testimony.43 But now that Rule 3.202 has been enacted and there is an-
other avenue available for the State to offer meaningful expert testimony
to rebut defense experts, the future of the State’s “sit-in” rule is probably
in question.
The Florida Supreme Court also allowed the prosecutor to depose the
defense experts as soon as the defense listed them. Although both the “sit-
in” rule and State depositions of defense experts are still available, the
enactment of Rule 3.202 has added, inter alia, another procedure to help
the State rebut mental health mitigation testimony by permitting the trial
judge to enter an order allowing the State’s experts to review the defense
experts’ data.44
However, simply allowing the State or its experts to review the de-
fense experts’ data is ineffective as an alternative to having the defendant
examined by the State’s doctors. Without their own examination, the
State’s experts will have only the defense experts’ work product from
which to testify. The State’s experts will not be able to ask the defendant
questions that the defendant’s experts did not ask. Nor will the State’s ex-
perts be able to ask follow-up questions suggested by the defense exami-
nations. And they will not have available, in the absence of the State’s
own examination, the defendant’s facial expressions and other body lan-
guage during questioning.
 When the defense lists its experts, the State already has an automatic
opportunity to review defense experts’ data for use in cross-examination.
A prosecutor may interview or depose defense experts as a prelude to the
defense doctors’ testifying on direct examination for the defendant.45
 However, these compensations to the State—of merely allowing its
experts to sit in a courtroom while defense experts testify or of permitting
the State to depose the defense experts and review their data46—are inef-
fective methods of ferreting out unreliable mental health testimony. The
                                                                                                         
43. See id. at 606 (discussing the witness sequestration rule and the court’s exemption of
State experts from the rule’s operation). The statutory authority for the witness sequestration rule
is section 90.616, Florida Statutes, which provides, in relevant part: “At the request of a party the
court shall order, or upon its own motion the court may order, witnesses excluded from a pro-
ceeding so that they cannot hear the testimony of other witnesses . . . . FLA. STAT. § 90.616(1)
(1995). The witness sequestration rule allows the court to prohibit currently nontestifying trial
witnesses from being in the courtroom while another witness is testifying. The purpose of the rule
is to prevent the coloring of one witness’s testimony by listening to the testimony of another wit-
ness.
44. See FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.202(e)(1).
45. See FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.220 (d)(1)(A) (requiring the defendant to furnish to the State
the names and addresses of any witnesses the defendant expects to call and establishing a pro-
cedure for the State to examine such witnesses).
46. See supra notes 42-45.
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State, therefore, needs its own rebuttal examination of capital defendants
who intend to present mental health mitigation testimony.
III.   RULE 3.202
A.   Acknowledgement of the Problem by the Florida Supreme Court
The Florida Supreme Court has acknowledged that unless the State re-
buts mental health mitigation evidence, it is deemed established.47 The su-
preme court also has recognized the State’s disadvantage in rebutting
mental health mitigation testimony48 and has adopted an insanity-type rule
to cure the problem. Florida’s insanity rule has both a provision for com-
pulsory examination—a provision allowing the State to conduct its own
examination of the defendant49—and a preclusion sanction.50 This sanc-
tion, crafted from case law, automatically precludes defense experts from
testifying if the defendant refuses the State’s compulsory examination.51
B.   The Preclusion Provisions of Rule 3.202
Rule 3.202 establishes procedures to offer defense evidence and to
grant the prosecution compensating opportunities. First, when a capital
defendant intends to present, in the penalty phase, the expert testimony of
a mental health professional who has “tested, evaluated, or examined the
defendant in order to establish statutory or nonstatutory mental mitigating
circumstances . . . , he or she must provide written notice of intent to of-
fer that testimony.”52 Second, after the filing of the notice and on motion
of the State within forty-eight hours of the defendant’s conviction for
                                                                                                         
47. See Nibert v. State, 574 So. 2d 1059, 1062 (Fla. 1990) (stating that “when a reason-
able quantum of competent, uncontroverted evidence of a mitigating circumstance is presented,
the trial court must find that the mitigating circumstance has been proved”) (emphasis added).
48. See Letter from Gerald Kogan, Justice, Florida Supreme Court, to Claire K. Luten,
Judge, then Chair of the Criminal Rules Committee of The Florida Bar (Mar. 13, 1991) (on
file with author), stating, in relevant part:
There currently is no rule of criminal procedure that would allow a state’s expert to
examine a defendant facing the death penalty when the defendant intends to establish
either statutory or nonstatutory mental mitigating factors during the penalty phase of
the capital trial. It thus appears that the state’s ability to rebut the defense’s evidence
of mental mitigation may be limited. Therefore, we request that the committee con-
sider whether a rule similar to Criminal Rule of Procedure 3.216 dealing with the
appointment of experts when a defendant intends to rely on the insanity defense
should be adopted to provide for the appointment of experts when a defendant in a
capital case intends to present mental mitigating evidence.
49. See FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.216 (d).
50. See FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.216 (b).
51. See Henry v. State, 574 So. 2d 66, 70 (Fla. 1991), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 101
(1971); Parkin v. State, 238 So. 2d 817, 822 (Fla. 1970), cert denied, 401 U.S. 974 (1971);
see also infra note 61 and accompanying text.
52. FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.202(b).
1996]                    CRIMINAL PROCEDURE RULE 3.202(E) 945
capital murder, the court shall order the defendant examined by the
State’s mental health expert.53 Third, “if the defendant refuses to be exam-
ined by or fully cooperate with the State’s mental health expert, the court
may . . . order the defense to allow the State’s expert to review all mental
health reports, tests, and evaluations by the defendant’s mental health ex-
pert; or prohibit defense mental health experts from testifying concerning
mental health tests, evaluations, or examinations of the defendant.”54
According to the Rule, if the defendant refuses the State’s examina-
tion, and the defendant’s experts would be able to testify only about their
examination, evaluation, or testing of the defendant, the defense experts
may be precluded from testifying if all they did was examine, evaluate, or
test the defendant.55 Although Rule 3.202 helps to put the State in a posi-
tion to rebut mental health mitigation testimony, there are several prob-
lems with the new Rule.
C.   Problems with the Rule
There are several problems with Rule 3.202(e). First, when a defen-
dant refuses the State’s examination, the Rule provides no guidelines to
the trial judge as to which sanctioning option she should choose for a par-
ticular situation. This failure will cause the Rule to be applied without
uniformity. Second, the Rule will allow some defendants to circumvent
the Rule. Defense experts, by excising that part of their testimony that
relates to their contact with a defendant, will still be able to testify hypo-
thetically that the defendant meets the mental health mitigating factors.
1.   No Guidance on Choice of Options
When the defendant refuses the State’s examination, the trial judge has
the following options: 1) to let the defense doctors testify, but let the State
doctors review the results of the defense experts’ examination and testing of
the defendant, or 2) to let the defense experts testify, but prohibit them from
testifying concerning the testing, evaluation, or examination of the defen-
dant.56
The Florida Rule will be difficult for trial courts to apply because the
Rule provides no guidelines for selecting the options. Why would a trial
judge choose the first sanction over the second sanction? The State al-
ready can discover information developed by defense experts because
                                                                                                         
53. FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.202(d).
54. FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.202(e).
55. This result occurs because Rule 3.202(e)(2) permits the trial court to prohibit
“defense mental health experts from testifying concerning mental health tests, evaluations, or
examinations” and, if the expert can give testimony based only on her testing, evaluation, or
examination of the defendant, the court will have to exclude the expert. FLA. R. CRIM. P.
3.202(e)(1), (2).
56. FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.202(e)(1), (2).
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Florida permits discovery depositions and discovery of opinions of ex-
perts.57 Why did the Florida Supreme Court insert the first sanction? Does
this option give the State a fair chance to rebut defense mitigation testi-
mony when defense experts will be able to back up their testimony with
the results of their examination and testing of the defendant, while the
State’s experts will have no such backing? Will the threat of using the
first option of the Florida Rule make the defendant submit to the State’s
examination?
Perhaps the court intended that the first option be used in nonwillful
refusal situations in which the defendant’s refusal is due to his mental ill-
ness. In such cases, the court may have considered that mandatory pre-
clusion may distort the truth by concealing the defendant’s mental illness
from the capital sentencer. That is, if the defendant had not refused the
State’s examination, State doctors would have confirmed the defendant’s
mental illness. Because the State cannot execute an insane defendant,58
only an appellate court would then have the uncertain opportunity to dis-
cover and resolve this remote possibility in postconviction proceedings.
This option allows this evidence of insanity at the trial level.
As to the second option, why would a judge use this “carve-out” sanc-
tion instead of total preclusion of the expert? The Criminal Procedure
Rules Committee of The Florida Bar urged the Florida Supreme Court to
include only preclusion/excision of defense experts as an option,59 but the
court rejected that position and adopted the “review or excise” rule.60 Al-
though it has approved mandatory preclusion in insanity cases,61 the court
                                                                                                         
57. See, e.g., FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.220(h) (discovery depositions), (d)(1)(B) (providing
that the defendant must disclose to the prosecutor data relating to expert testimony, including
results of mental examinations).
58. The Eighth Amendment prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment prohibits
the execution of the insane. See Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 409-10 (1986) (holding
that death penalty is disproportionate punishment for an insane defendant); see also 18
MENTAL & PHYSICAL DISABILITY L. REP. 704, 704 (1994) (stating that “[i]n no circumstances
may a court sentence to death a person who, as a result of mental disability, lacks the mental
capacity to understand the death penalty and why it is being imposed”) (citation omitted). But
see Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 340 (1989) (stating that mental retardation alone does
not preclude a death sentence).
59. Proposed official draft, FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.220(n), attached as exhibit to The Florida Bar’s
Emergency Petition To Amend Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.220 (Fla. 1994) (No. 84273).
60. In re Amendments to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.220, 654 So. 2d 915,
915-16 (Fla. 1995).
61. See, e.g., Parkin v. State, 238 So. 2d 817, 822 (Fla. 1970), cert. den., 401 U.S. 974
(1971). The court stated that
[w]here a defendant in a criminal case serves notice that she will rely upon a defense
of insanity and the court . . . orders her to give testimonial response to court-
appointed psychiatrists under pain of forfeiting the testimony of her . . . psychiatrist,
the defendant’s rights to freedom from self-incrimination are not invaded.
Id.; McMunn v. State, 264 So. 2d 868, 870 (Fla. 1st DCA 1972) (stating that “[i]t is well set-
tled in Florida that a defendant who relies on the defense of insanity must cooperate with court-
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is perhaps concerned with the constitutionality of mandatory preclusion in
light of the United States Supreme Court’s opinion in Lockett v. Ohio,62
which requires admission in the penalty phase of any relevant mitigating
evidence that might call for a sentence less than death.63 If so, such con-
cern is misplaced. The cases that predated Lockett and those that have
followed have demonstrated clearly that potentially relevant defense miti-
gation testimony can be excluded in the penalty phase if such evidence is
unreliable and unfairly prejudices the State.64
2.   Some Defense Experts May Still Testify
According to the plain wording of Rule 3.202(e), some defense experts
may still testify, even if the defendant refuses the State’s examination.
They must simply excise all mention of their examination, evaluation, or
testing of the defendant.65 But how can an expert carve out or disregard
one-half of what she knows and render an opinion based only on the other
half? If the expert cannot separate the two halves and tells the court she
cannot render an opinion based on the trial court’s use of the second op-
tion, the court is back to the type of total preclusion used in insanity de-
fense cases.66 With more appellate issues for the defense, the trial court’s
time is wasted in hearings to decide which sanction to impose.
Rule 3.202(e) contains another problem. If the defense expert is able
to carve out the results from his examination of the defendant and still
testify, or if the defense presents a mental health expert who has not ex-
amined the defendant, the defendant may still use such an expert to cir-
cumvent the plain intent of the Rule.
The purpose of the Rule is to level the playing field between the de-
fendant and the State.67 Therefore, if the defendant refuses a State exami-
nation, the defendant’s expert should not be able to use the results of her
examination as a basis of her opinion before the jury. Although that is
                                                                                                         
appointed experts by answering questions propounded to him, or in the alternative be pre-
cluded from offering his independent expert testimony upon the subject”) (citation omitted).
62. 438 U.S. 586 (1978).
63. Id. at 604-06.
64. See infra part V.D.
65. Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.202(e) provides, in pertinent part:
(e) Defendant’s Refusal To Cooperate. If the defendant refuses to be examined by or
fully cooperate with the state’s mental health expert, the court may, in its discretion:
(1) order the defense to allow the state’s expert to review all mental health reports,
tests, and evaluations by the defendant’s mental health expert; or
(2) prohibit defense mental health experts from testifying concerning mental health
tests, evaluations, or examinations of the defendant.
FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.202(e).
66. See supra note 55.
67. See In re Amendments to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.202, 654 So. 2d 915,
915-16 (Fla. 1995).
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what the Rule provides, the State may be prejudiced by a situation in
which Rule 3.202 still permits the defense expert to testify.
 For example, the defense could call a nonexamining defense expert in
the penalty phase to testify generally as to what constitutes extreme men-
tal or emotional disturbance or some other mitigating factor. The expert
could then describe the characteristics of individuals who meet that miti-
gating factor. Then, the defense could present lay witnesses, such as the
defendant’s mother or brother, who could testify that the defendant pos-
sesses those characteristics. The defense could thereby present to the
judge or jury the factual equivalent of a defense examination of the defen-
dant as a basis for an expert’s opinion.68
The court has left this opening for capital defendants by patterning
Rule 3.202 on its decision in Hickson v. State.69 In Hickson, the court
held that the defense could present either of two kinds of battered-spouse
expert testimony at trial.70 First, the defense could present an expert who
would generally describe battered-spouse syndrome and the characteristics
present in individuals suffering from the syndrome, in which case the
State would have no right to examine the defendant.71 The State also could
present an expert who could generally describe the characteristics of the
syndrome.72 Under this Hickson option, the State would have no right to
have the defendant examined.
 Under the second Hickson option, if the defense planned to present an
expert who had examined the defendant and would state that the defendant
suffered from battered-spouse syndrome, the State could elect to examine
the defendant and, if the defendant refused, the court could preclude de-
fense experts from testifying.73
In Dillbeck v. State,74 the Florida Supreme Court adopted the Hickson
rule for use in capital cases and thereby provided a capital defendant with
a means of presenting expert mental health mitigation testimony without
                                                                                                         
68. This scenario is based on the fact that Rule 3.202 evolved from two sources: the
Florida Supreme Court’s decisions in Hickson v. State, 630 So. 2d 172, 176 (Fla. 1993)
(setting up guidelines for defendants wishing to rely on the battered-spouse syndrome defense
by stating that if such a defendant wishes to present testimony of an expert who has examined
her, she must submit to an examination by the State’s expert, whose testimony may be used to
rebut her expert’s testimony; if she decides to have an expert who has not examined her testify
only generally about the syndrome or to answer only hypothetical questions, the State cannot
have defendant examined by its expert but may present its own expert to testify as to generali-
ties and hypotheticals); and Dillbeck v. State, 643 So. 2d 1027, 1030 (Fla. 1994), cert. denied,
115 S. Ct. 1371 (1995) (applying the Hickson rule to defense presentation of mental health
mitigation in the penalty phase of a capital case).
69. 630 So. 2d 172 (Fla. 1993).
70. Id. at 176.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 175.
74. 643 So. 2d 1027 (Fla. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 1371 (1995).
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submitting to an examination by the State.75 By adopting the Hickson rule,
the Dillbeck court also provided the State with a means of precluding de-
fense experts’ evidence  when a defendant is examined by his own expert
but refuses to submit to the State’s examination.
IV.   LESSER ALTERNATIVE SANCTIONS TO PRECLUSION
One could easily envision three sanctions less severe than total preclu-
sion of defense mental health experts when an accused refuses to submit
to a court-ordered mental health examination by prosecution experts.
First, the court could hold the defendant in contempt for refusing a court
order. Second, the court could give an evidence-of-refusal instruction to
the jury. Third, the court could use sections 90.107,76 90.403,77 or
90.70478 of the Florida Evidence Code to exclude the defense evidence or
limit the effect of it.
Section 90.107 provides that where evidence is admissible for one
purpose but not another, “the court, upon request, shall restrict such evi-
dence to its proper scope and so inform the jury . . . .”79 Section 90.403
provides that evidence, although relevant, “is inadmissible if its probative
value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, con-
fusion of the issues, misleading the jury, or needless presentation of cu-
mulative evidence.”80
 Section 90.704 provides that “[t]he facts or data upon which an expert
bases an opinion or inference may be those perceived by or made known
to the expert at or before the trial. If the facts or data are of a type rea-
sonably relied upon by experts in the subject to support the opinion ex-
pressed, the facts or data need not be admissible in evidence.”81
A.   Holding the Defendant in Contempt
Contempt can be either civil or criminal. The purpose of criminal
contempt, when the court is enforcing Rule 3.202,82 would be to punish
the accused for violating a court order compelling him to be examined.
                                                                                                         
75. Id. at 1031 (stating that a procedure comparable to Hickson would be helpful in capi-
tal trials; adopting the Hickson rule as a temporary measure for governing testimony of mental
health experts in capital proceedings; and stating that the court had asked the Criminal Proce-
dure Rules Committee of The Florida Bar to submit a proposed permanent rule addressing this
issue).
The Criminal Procedure Rules Committee did submit a rule, but the court rejected The Bar’s
rule because it preferred to adopt its Hickson-like Rule 3.202. See supra part III.C.1.
76. FLA. STAT. § 90.107 (1995).
77. Id. § 90.403.
78. Id. § 90.704.
79. Id. § 90.107.
80. Id. § 90.403.
81. Id. § 90.704.
82. FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.202.
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The theory is that the defendant’s fear of being imprisoned would result in
his agreement to be examined by the State’s doctor. The purpose of a
criminal contempt sanction would be to coerce a defendant’s compliance
with the court’s compulsory examination order.
However, because the maximum sentence in a nonjury trial for crimi-
nal contempt is six months,83 fear of punishment for contempt is unlikely
to coerce compliance from a capital defendant who has likely been incar-
cerated since his arrest and is facing death. The civil contempt sanction,
like the sanction for criminal contempt, would hardly produce compliance
because a defendant in the penalty phase of a capital case would likely see
any delay as a benefit rather than a detriment. Thus, imposing civil or
criminal sanctions would be ineffective in getting the defendant examined
by the state doctors, but it would achieve one thing; it would interrupt and
delay the trial and, for that reason, is contraindicated.
But a defendant facing a possible death sentence might refuse the
court-ordered mental health examination and might even do so on advice
of his lawyer. The lawyer, simply considering a cost-benefit analysis to
the accused in this life and death struggle, might be tempted to give such
advice.84 The difficulty in assessing blame between the defendant and his
lawyer, as well as the relatively insignificant period of incarceration,
would render the contempt sanction useless.85
B.   The Evidence-of-Refusal Instruction
As an alternative to precluding defense experts from testifying because
the defendant refused the State’s examination, the court could let the de-
fense experts testify, but it could give the jury a preliminary instruction.
The court could, in this regard, instruct the jury as follows: “The defen-
dant in this cause filed a notice of intention to present, during the penalty
phase of this trial, expert testimony of mental health professionals who
had tested, evaluated, or examined the defendant in order to establish
statutory or nonstatutory mental mitigating circumstances. Consequently,
                                                                                                         
83. See Bloom v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 194, 197 (1968) (holding that criminal contempt is a
“petty offense” if the punishment is limited to six months or less in jail, but ruling that if the
punishment is for more than six months, the accused is entitled to a jury trial).
84. Would such advice be proper? Would it subject the attorney to prosecution for contempt
and Bar disciplinary sanctions? Such interrogatories open a Pandora’s box of difficult constitu-
tional, evidentiary, and practical dilemmas. The court could not force a defendant to reveal what
his lawyer told him if that disclosure would incriminate the defendant in a contempt prosecution.
U.S. CONST. amend. V. The advice given by counsel to a defendant in this situation may not be
subject to compelled disclosure because of attorney-client privilege and the Sixth Amendment
right to counsel. See 8 JOHN H. WIGMORE, WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE § 2292, at 554
(McNaughton rev. 1961).
85. See Taylor v. Illinois, 484 U.S. 400, 418 (1988) (stating that, given the attorney-
client privilege and the likelihood that extreme cases may involve unscrupulous conduct by cli-
ent and lawyer, the requirement of an investigation into relative responsibilities of attorney and
client, before applying the preclusion sanction, would be impracticable).
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pursuant to Rule 3.202, I ordered the defendant to be examined by a
mental health expert chosen by the State. The defendant refused to be ex-
amined by the State’s expert. You may consider the defendant’s refusal in
considering the testimony of his experts.”
However, there are three problems with an evidence-of-refusal in-
struction. First, it is sometimes difficult to determine whether, in fact, the
defendant’s conduct constitutes a “refusal” to be examined by the State’s
doctors. Second, an evidence-of-refusal instruction might arguably consti-
tute an unconstitutional comment on the defendant’s Fifth Amendment
privilege against self-incrimination. Third, if the defense experts do tes-
tify, even with an evidence-of-refusal instruction, the State’s case could
suffer prejudice because the defense could explain away the refusal in its
closing argument.
1.   Constitutionality
Before considering whether to give an evidence-of-refusal instruction,
the court must determine whether, in fact, the accused has refused to co-
operate with the examination. In State v. Williams,86 the State’s psychia-
trist examined the defendant.87 During the examination, the defendant was
“evasive and uncooperative,” responded “I don’t know” to many ques-
tions, and denied any memory of the time the crime was committed.88 The
State’s doctor was unable to elicit any detailed background of defendant’s
medical history.89 Upon reexamination, the defendant continued to be un-
cooperative.90
Based on the defendant’s conduct, the State sought to have the trial
court preclude Williams’s insanity defense and exclude the defendant’s
expert from testifying because of the defendant’s refusal to be examined
by the State’s doctor.91 The court denied the State’s motion, and the de-
fense expert testified at trial, as did the State’s doctor.92 The defense doc-
tor testified to the defendant’s insanity, and the State’s doctor, basing his
opinion on examinations of the accused and reports of other experts, con-
cluded that the defendant was “malingering to avoid criminal prosecu-
tion.”93 The prosecution’s doctor diagnosed the defendant as having an
“adjustment disorder and an antisocial personality disorder.”94 The trial
jury rejected the insanity defense and found the defendant guilty, and the
defendant appealed. In considering the State’s cross-appeal that the trial
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court should have precluded the defendant’s defense of insanity based on
his refusal to be examined by the State’s doctor, the Arizona Supreme
Court rejected the State’s argument.95 The court said that “[a]lthough de-
fendant was uncooperative and evasive, his behavior provided support for
[the prosecution’s psychiatric] diagnosis of malingering to avoid prosecu-
tion. The trial court found that [the State’s doctor], aided by collateral
sources, was able to reach a conclusion about [the] defendant’s ability to
tell right from wrong . . . .”96
Based upon the reasoning in Williams, a court should look beyond a
capital defendant’s words of refusal. If a prosecution expert, upon the ba-
sis of his contact with the defendant and his use of collateral sources, has
enough information to reach a conclusion about the applicability of the
mental health mitigating factors, the defendant has not refused to be ex-
amined and, consequently, cannot be sanctioned.
If, however, the State’s doctor cannot render an opinion because of the
refusal, can a trial court, as an alternative to preclusion, constitutionally
instruct a jury about that refusal? The United States Supreme Court dis-
cussed the constitutionality of evidence-of-refusal instructions in South
Dakota v. Neville.97 In Neville, the defendant refused a chemical test to
determine his blood alcohol level.98 A state statute permitted the defen-
dant’s refusal to be used against him at trial, but the trial court suppressed
the evidence of the refusal.99 The South Dakota Supreme Court affirmed
the suppression of the refusal and held that the defendant’s refusal was a
“communicative act” protected by the federal and state privilege against
self-incrimination.100
The United States Supreme Court disagreed. Justice O’Connor, writ-
ing for the majority, cited authority for the proposition that a refusal is
not testimonial but is a real or physical act and is “similar to other cir-
cumstantial evidence of a consciousness of guilt, such as escape from
custody and suppression of evidence.”101 However, Justice O’Connor
avoided deciding the case on whether a refusal was real or physical evi-
dence, on the one hand, or a communication or testimony, on the other.
She chose to ground her opinion on the compulsion or coercion issue.102
                                                                                                         
95. Id.
96. Id. at 1355-56.
97. 459 U.S. 553 (1983).
98. Id. at 555.
99. Id. at 556.
100. Id. at 557.
101. Id. at 561 n.11.
102. Id. at 562 (Justice O’Connor stated, “Since no impermissible coercion is involved
when the suspect refuses to submit to the test, regardless of the form of refusal, we prefer to
rest our decision on this ground . . . .”).
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The Neville Court held that the coercion requirement comes straight
from the text of the Constitution.103 The Court concluded, “[T]he State did
not directly compel [Neville] to refuse the test, for it gave him the choice
of submitting to the test or refusing [it].”104 The Court stated, however,
that the mere fact that the defendant is given a choice does not end the
compulsion analysis.105 The Court referred to the “classic Fifth Amend-
ment violation—telling a defendant at trial to testify . . . .”106 In such a
case, the defendant would be placed in a “cruel trilemma”: “submit to
self-accusation, or testify falsely (risking perjury), or decline to testify
(risking contempt).”107 The Neville Court noted that it “had long recog-
nized that the Fifth Amendment prevents the State from forcing the choice
of this ‘cruel trilemma’ on the defendant.”108
In rejecting the applicability of the “cruel trilemma” example to the
case before it, the Neville Court found that the privilege against self-
incrimination protects only against incriminating results flowing from
constitutionally protected choices.109 The Court reasoned, “Unlike situa-
tions in which a defendant has a constitutional right to remain silent at
trial and thus not incriminate himself, [the defendant in this case] is law-
fully required to submit to chemical testing and is not protected by the
Constitution when he refuses.”110 Just as the defendant in Neville was law-
fully required to submit to chemical testing and was not protected by the
Constitution when he refused, a capital defendant is lawfully required to
be examined by State’s doctors when he chooses to put his mental state at
issue. If he refuses, he is likewise not protected.
Although not directly addressing the constitutionality of an evidence-
of-refusal instruction in insanity cases, the Ninth Circuit held, in a corol-
lary situation, that the State can introduce testimony of the defendant’s re-
fusal to submit to an examination and will not thereby implicate the de-
fendant’s privilege against self-incrimination. In Karstetter v. Cardwell,111
the defendant who had filed notice of his intention to plead not guilty by
reason of insanity refused, based on the Fifth Amendment, a court order
to be examined by the State’s doctors.112 Over the State’s objection, the
defense put on its insanity defense.113 In rebuttal, a State psychiatrist told
                                                                                                         
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. Id. at 562-63.
106. Id. at 563.
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. Susan W. Crump, The Admission of Chemical Test Refusals After State v. Neville:
Drunk Drivers Cannot Take the Fifth, 59 N.D. L. REV. 349, 360 (1983).
110. Id.; see also Neville, 459 U.S. at 560 n.10.
111. 526 F.2d 1144 (9th Cir. 1975).
112. Id. at 1145.
113. Id.
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the jury that the defendant had “refused” a psychiatric examination.114 The
Ninth Circuit, in considering the effect the State doctor’s testimony had
on the defendant’s Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination,
held that the defendant’s privilege against self-incrimination did not pro-
tect him from being compelled to talk to the State’s experts.115 The court
stated that, in the Ninth Circuit, a trial court could order a psychiatric ex-
amination of a defendant if that defendant intended to use the insanity de-
fense and present expert testimony on the issue.116 A court could not,
however, go too far by giving a consciousness-of-guilt instruction.117
 In United States v. Wagner,118 a State doctor testified that he had at-
tempted to examine the defendant, who had refused examination.119 The
district court instructed the jury that there was evidence that the defendant
had refused to obey a lawful court order to speak to a government psy-
chiatrist.120 The court told the jury that the order did not violate the defen-
dant’s privilege against self-incrimination because it did not require the
defendant to testify.121 However, the jury was not to consider the refusal
to obey the order sufficient to show guilt of the offense charged because
an innocent person held on such charges might refuse to submit to a psy-
chiatric examination.122 The jury was allowed to consider the defendant’s
refusal, however, and to “give it such weight as [the jury thought] it was
entitled to as tending to prove consciousness of guilt.”123 But the Ninth
Circuit, in reversing the district court, stated that “this court has held that
‘[a]n attempt by a criminal defendant to suppress evidence is probative of
consciousness of guilt and admissible on that basis.’ . . . However, a de-
fendant’s refusal to submit to a mental examination does not suppress evi-
dence directly implicating the defendant in the underlying crime.”124
As suggested in Wagner, evidence-of-refusal instructions have also
been used in non-DUI cases when, for example, defendants refused to be
fingerprinted or refused to appear in a lineup.125 In addition to the grounds
stated in Wagner, these instructions have withstood Fifth Amendment
objections because the refusal to submit has been interpreted as a physical
act rather than a communicative act.126 Such refusal does not involve the
compelling of “testimonial” evidence because, as stated by Justice





118. 834 F.2d 1474 (9th Cir. 1987).





124. Id. (citations omitted).
125. Id. at 1484 n.8.
126. South Dakota v. Neville, 459 U.S. 553, 560-61 (1983).
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O’Connor in Neville, coercion is the issue, not the testimonial/physical
dichotomy.127
Based on Neville, a defendant in the penalty phase of a capital case has
no constitutional right to refuse the State’s compulsory examination.128
Consequently, a court can lawfully require a defendant to submit to such
examination, and the Constitution does not protect such defendants when
they refuse.
Admitting evidence that a defendant in the penalty phase refused to be
examined by the State’s rebuttal experts, therefore, meets the Neville tests
so long as the instruction does not constitute a “consciousness of guilt”
instruction. The defendant’s refusal is not coerced. The defendant is the
one who has raised the mental health defense. He has, in this regard,
raised an affirmative defense to the imposition of the death penalty,129 and
if the State does not rebut the defense, the mitigation evidence is estab-
lished as a matter of law.130 As noted by the United States Supreme Court
in Walton,131 defendants who raise mental health mitigation issues are, in
essence, raising affirmative defenses;132 hence, they are not being com-
pelled to do anything. The government is simply placing the condition of
a required State examination on such a defendant’s exercise of the state-
granted right to raise mental health mitigation. The penalty-phase defen-
dant is being given a constitutional choice. He is not being placed in the
trilemma.
Advising the sentencing jury that the defendant refused the State’s
compulsory examination could, however, affect the reliability of the sen-
tencing jury’s decision to the detriment of the defense. The defense evi-
dence may be accurate and it may be reliable. The jury just does not
know in the absence of the State’s examination, and the instruction will
put a jury on guard as to this aspect. Through the instruction, the jury will
become aware that the evidence cannot be validated or contradicted be-
cause the State has been precluded from administering its independent ex-
                                                                                                         
127. Id. at 561-62.
128. See United States v. Byers, 740 F.2d 1104, 1115 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (plurality opinion)
(Writing for a six-judge Court, then-Judge Scalia, joined by then-Judges Ginsburg and Bork,
stated, “We hold that when a defendant raises the defense of insanity, he may constitutionally
be subjected to compulsory examination by court-appointed or government psychiatrists . . .
.”).
129. See Walton v. Arizona, 497 U.S. 639, 680 (1990) (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
130. Id.
131. Id. at 639.
132. See id. at 680 (1990) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (characterizing majority’s holding—
that capital defendant must prove mitigating circumstances by a preponderance of the evi-
dence—as misplaced reliance upon noncapital cases upholding the State’s right to place upon
the defendant the burden of proving an affirmative defense; stating that such decisions rest
upon a premise inapplicable in the capital sentencing context). But see id. at 681 (Blackmun,
J., dissenting) (criticizing the plurality’s comparison of defense mental health mitigation evi-
dence to an affirmative defense).
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amination. The sentencing jury may disregard the defense evidence in
light of the refusal instruction and may, therefore, recommend the death
sentence. The defense will naturally prefer, without waiving its objection
to having to choose between two allegedly unconstitutional choices, to
have the refusal instruction in lieu of preclusion. However, the issue for
the court is the integrity of the trial evidence.
2.   Fairness of Refusal Instructions to the State
If an evidence-of-refusal instruction is used, defense experts may still
testify during the penalty phase. However, an evidence-of-refusal instruc-
tion does not level the playing field for the State because the State’s pen-
alty-phase argument on the refusal issue will never adequately rebut the
defense argument. For example, the State, pursuant to an evidence-of-
refusal instruction, may argue during its penalty-phase closing argument
that the defendant refused the State examination because the defendant is
faking a mental disorder and seeking to avoid detection. The defense may
then argue, assuming defense experts have provided a testimonial basis,
that the defendant refused the examination because the defendant is a
paranoid schizophrenic. How do we know that the defendant is a paranoid
schizophrenic, the defense will query? Because, the defense will argue,
the defense experts say so based upon their examination of the defendant.
The defense experts may even say that agreeing to examinations by doc-
tors they trust (the defense examination) and refusing examinations by
doctors they do not trust (the State’s requested examination) is a typical
reaction for a paranoid schizophrenic. Hence, the defense is always likely
to defeat the State’s argument when a refusal instruction is used as an al-
ternative to preclusion.
Consequently, fear of receiving evidence-of-refusal instructions will
not force capital defendants to submit to the State’s compulsory examina-
tion because it is too easy for the defense to explain why the defendant re-
fused the State’s examination. The evidence-of-refusal instruction, fur-
thermore, does not provide an equitable alternative to the State’s need for
the compulsory examination of the accused.
 Why should a court or the State rely on an evidence-of-refusal in-
struction if, in fact, penalty-phase preclusion of defense experts is consti-
tutional? After all, preclusion is less problematic, better ensures the reli-
ability of mental health testimony, and is more effective in maintaining a
fair defendant/prosecution balance.
C.   Evidentiary Preclusion and Limiting Instructions
The Florida Evidence Code, which is based on analogous rules in the
Federal Rules of Evidence, contains provisions that may be used on a
case-by-case basis to preclude defense evidence or limit its effect. From
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the previous discussion concerning the unreliability of mental health tes-
timony, it would seem that the defense’s psychiatric testimony may, at
times, be held inadmissible under Florida Statutes sections 90.107,
90.704, and 90.403 because certain theories have failed to gain general
acceptance in the field to which they belong.133
Experts who testify perform two tasks. They give opinions to the trier
of fact and, typically, they relate to the factfinder the factual basis for
those opinions. If a defense expert can testify that, in his opinion, the de-
fendant is subject to one of the mental health mitigation factors, may the
doctor tell the jury that the opinion is partly based upon 1) the written
and/or oral statements of the accused during the clinical examination and
psychological testing and 2) the expert’s observations of the accused? Put
another way, may the State prohibit a defense doctor from informing the
jury of the basis of her opinion? If not, may the State obtain a limiting
instruction134 informing the jury that it should consider the defendant’s
statements and conduct only as they relate to the basis of the expert’s
opinion, but not as proof of the truth of those statements? Would such a
limiting instruction, even if it were constitutional, ensure the reliability of
the mental health evidence and ensure the State a fair opportunity to rebut
the testimony?
Federal Rule of Evidence 703—Florida Statutes section 90.704’s ana-
logue—defines the information upon which an expert can rely in giving
opinions.135 However, Federal Rule 703—and, consequently, section
                                                                                                         
133. Under the admissibility of scientific evidence test promulgated in Frye v. United
States, 293 Fed. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923), and adopted by the Florida Supreme Court in Stokes
v. State, 548 So. 2d 188, 193 (Fla. 1989),
[an] expert’s opinion which is based on scientific principle, theory or methodology is
admissible only when the underlying scientific principle, theory or methodology is
generally accepted in the field in which it belongs. Not only must the evidence be
based on a scientific principle, theory or methodology which is scientifically valid,
the procedures followed to apply the technique or process must also be generally ac-
cepted in the relevant scientific community.
CHARLES EHRHARDT, FLORIDA EVIDENCE § 702.3, at 510-11 (1996 ed.). In following Frye,
the Florida Supreme Court has chosen not to apply the more liberal approach set forth by the
U.S. Supreme Court in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 113 S. Ct. 2786
(1993). Therefore, a challenge to the admissibility of scientific evidence has a greater likeli-
hood of success in Florida than in those states following Daubert. See generally EHRHARDT,
supra, §§ 702.3, .4.
134. See section 90.107, Florida Statutes, providing that “[w]hen evidence which is ad-
missible as to one party or for one purpose, but inadmissible as to another party or for another
purpose is admitted, the court, upon request, shall restrict such evidence to its proper scope
and so inform the jury at the time it is admitted.” FLA. STAT. § 90.107 (1995).
135. Rule 703 provides:
The facts or data in the particular case upon which an expert bases an opinion or in-
ference may be those perceived by or made known to the expert at or before the
hearing. If of a type reasonably relied upon by experts in the particular field in
forming opinions or inferences upon the subject, the facts or data need not be ad-
missible in evidence.
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90.704—addresses the admission of the information.136 Some courts admit
the information upon which an expert relies as “full, substantive evi-
dence.”137 Other courts admit the opinion of the expert only as substantive
evidence138 underlying facts for the “limited purpose of explaining or sup-
porting the expert’s opinion.139 One federal court has said that Federal
Rule 703 “is like a hearsay exception: disclosure of the source underlying
an expert’s opinion requires trustworthiness and reliability.”140
Whether juries can distinguish between evidence admitted substan-
tively and evidence admitted for a limited purpose is doubtful.141 Courts
routinely give limiting instructions to help juries distinguish between the
two, but the effectiveness of limiting instructions is also questionable.
Some courts and commentators suggest that such instructions are ineffec-
tive and disregarded by juries,142 while others maintain that juries can and
do follow the court’s limiting instructions.143
Section 90.403, Florida Statutes,144 also could be used in conjunction
with section 90.704, Florida Statutes, in order to (1) exclude a defense
                                                                                                         
FED. R. EVID. 703; see also Anne A. Epps, Clarifying the Meaning of Federal Rule of Evi-
dence 703, 36 B.C. L. REV. 53, 54 n.11 (1994).
See section 90.704, Florida Statutes, providing that
[t]he facts or data upon which an expert bases an opinion or inference may be those
perceived by, or made known to, the expert at or before the trial. If the facts or data
are of a type reasonably relied upon by experts in the subject to support the opinion
expressed, the facts or data need not be admissible in evidence.
FLA. STAT. § 90.704 (1995).
136. See Epps, supra note 135, at 54.
137. See id. at 55; see also id. at 54-55 n.11 (citing cases and other scholars).
138. See id. at 55.
139. See id.; see also id. n.12 (citing cases).
140. Id. at 79 n.112 (citing Emigh v. Consolidated Rail Corp., 710 F. Supp. 608, 611
(W.D. Pa. 1989)); see also infra part V (discussing reliability of evidence as the constitutional
benchmark for upholding or reversing trial court admissibility/preclusion decisions).
141. See Epps, supra note 135, at 73 n.90 (citing courts and commentators).
142. See, e.g., Robert R. Calo, Joint Trials, Spillover Prejudice, and the Ineffectiveness of
a Bare Limiting Instruction, 9 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC. 21, 25 (1985); SAUL M. KASSIN &
LAWRENCE S. WRIGHTSMAN, THE AMERICAN JURY ON TRIAL: PSYCHOLOGICAL PER-
SPECTIVES 108-09 (1988); Blumenthal v. United States, 332 U.S. 539, 559-60 (1947); Bruton
v. United States, 391 U.S. 123, 135 (1968) (stating that “there are some contexts in which the
risk that the jury will not, or cannot, follow instructions is so great, and the consequences of
failure so vital to the defendant, that the practical and human limitations of the jury system
cannot be ignored”).
143. See, e.g., Parker v. Randolph, 442 U.S. 62, 73 (1979) (Rehnquist, J.). The Court
stated that
[a] crucial assumption underlying [the jury system] is that juries will follow the in-
structions given them by the trial judge. Were this not so, it would be pointless for a
trial court to instruct a jury, and even more pointless for an appellate court to reverse
a criminal conviction because the jury was improperly instructed.
Id.; Francis v. Franklin, 471 U.S. 307, 324 n.9 (1985) (“Absent . . . extraordinary situations . . . we
adhere to the crucial assumption underlying our constitutional system of trial by jury that ju-
rors carefully follow instructions.”).
144. Section 90.403 of the Florida Evidence Code provides that “[r]elevant evidence is in-
admissible if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice,
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expert’s entire testimony or (2) redact from the jury’s consideration that
part of the expert’s underlying opinion pertaining to the defendant’s
statements, behaviors, and test results when the probative value of such
testimony is substantially outweighed by the danger of prejudice, confu-
sion of the issues, or misleading of the jury.145
When a capital defendant refuses the State’s compulsory rebuttal ex-
amination, the State could argue that the defense’s mental health testi-
mony has no probative value or that any probative value is substantially
outweighed by the dangers of unfair prejudice to the State, confusion of
the issues, or misleading of the jury. The State, in this regard, can make
an argument in accord with authority, cited previously in this Article, that
mental health testimony is unreliable146 and, hence, without probative
value and that its admission would unfairly prejudice the State or mislead
the jury. If the court refuses to exclude the defense testimony in its en-
tirety, the State could seek to exclude that part of the defense expert’s
testimony relying on the defendant’s oral or written statements obtained
from clinical examinations or psychological testing as hearsay and an at-
tempt to admit the defendant’s statements without subjecting them to
cross-examination.147
Even if the State loses this point, the court could preclude defense ex-
perts from repeating any of the defendant’s exculpatory statements. The
court could prohibit the defense expert from being used as a conduit for
the defendant’s testimony by requiring the expert to transmit to the jury
paraphrased, as opposed to verbatim, exculpatory statements upon which
the expert relies.148
                                                                                                         
confusion of the issues, misleading the jury, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence.”
FLA. STAT. § 90.403 (1995).
145. But see supra notes 141-42 and accompanying text (concerning the inefficacy of limit-
ing instructions).
146. See supra part II.C., D., E.
147. See, e.g., Emigh v. Consolidated Rail Corp., 710 F. Supp. 608 (1989), stating,
Although Rule 703 does permit an expert to disclose the underlying facts or data
supporting his opinion, he may do so only if he reasonably relied upon those
sources; [h]owever, we do not believe that the reasonable reliance requirement
permits a court to relinquish its independent responsibilities to determine if the un-
derlying source meets the most minimum standards of reliability and trustworthi-
ness as a prerequisite to admissibility . . . . When the underlying source is so unreli-
able as to render it more prejudicial than probative, making it inadmissible under
Rule 403, Rule 703 cannot be used as a backdoor to get the evidence before the jury.
Id. at 611-12.
148. See Gacy v. Welborn, 994 F.2d 305, 306-315 (7th Cir. 1993) (in which defendant,
accused of killing 33 young men and dumping their bodies under his house, presented his in-
sanity defense through four psychiatrists and two psychologists; the trial judge refused to
permit the defendant to use the doctors to transmit to the jury the verbatim statements he made
to them; the judge ruled that these statements were hearsay when offered for the truth of the
matter asserted; however, the judge did allow the defense doctors to paraphrase the substance
of statements for the jury; the Seventh Circuit held that the trial judge had committed no con-
stitutional error).
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If a court refuses to exclude the defendant’s statements in their entirety
or to restrict the defense expert to a summary of the defendant’s statements,
the State would be left with the option of asking the court to issue a limit-
ing instruction on the admitted evidence. Fear of this sanction, it would
be hoped by the State, would force the defendant’s participation in the
compulsory examination. However, fear of receiving a limiting instruc-
tion will not force a capital defendant to submit to the State’s compulsory
examination because, as previously discussed,149 it is too easy for the de-
fense to explain why the defendant refused the State’s examination.
Preclusion is better than any lesser alternative sanctions. It is less
problematic, more reliable, and more effective in maintaining a fair indi-
vidual/State balance. But, is it constitutional?
V.   THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF RULE 3.202
A.   The Constitutional Dilemma
Although the states do have freedom to draft rules of evidence and
procedure to run their own courts, the United States Constitution imposes
some limits on those rules.150 Since 1967, the Supreme Court has recog-
nized, under the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment, the right
of a defendant to present reliable and exculpatory evidence and witnesses
in his defense. This right is incorporated through the Fourteenth Amend-
ment and made applicable in all state prosecutions.151 This right is derived
from the Sixth Amendment clause that provides that “[i]n all criminal
prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to have compulsory
process for obtaining witnesses in his favor.152 As stated by the Court in
Washington v. Texas,153 “the framers of the Constitution did not intend to
commit the futile act of giving to a defendant the right to secure the atten-
dance of witnesses whose testimony he had no right to use.”154 The defen-
dant’s general Fourteenth Amendment right to due process also limits the
operation of state court rules of evidence and procedure.155 The defen-
                                                                                                         
149. See supra part IV.B.2.
150. See infra part V.D. (discussing, inter alia, Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284,
294 (1973), and the nullification of Mississippi’s voucher rule when conflicting with a defen-
dant’s Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment rights to present defense evidence).
151. Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14, 18 (1967) (recognizing a defendant’s Sixth
Amendment right to present a defense as applying to the states through the Due Process Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment).
152. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
153. 388 U.S. 14 (1967).
154. Id. at 23.
155. See, e.g., Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 294, 302 (1973) (stating that
“[d]ue process is, in essence, the right to a fair opportunity to defend against the State’s accusa-
tions . . . . [State evidentiary rules] may not be applied mechanistically to defeat the ends of
justice”).
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dant’s right to present evidence, however, is not absolute, and “[i]n the
exercise of this right, the accused, as is required of the State, must com-
ply with established rules of procedure and evidence designed to assure
both fairness and reliability in the ascertainment of guilt and inno-
cence.”156 If the State interest is strong enough, even relevant and reliable
evidence can be excluded.157
B.   Preclusion of Witnesses for Discovery Violations
The Sixth Amendment provides that an accused has the right to com-
pulsory process for obtaining defense witnesses.158 The United States Su-
preme Court, in Washington, interpreted the Sixth Amendment as stand-
ing for the proposition that “[t]he right to offer the testimony of wit-
nesses, and to compel their attendance . . . is in plain terms the right to
present a defense. . . .”159 The right is applicable to the states through the
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.160 But the right is not
absolute, for the “Sixth Amendment does not confer the right to present
testimony free from the legitimate demands of the adversarial system . . .
.”161
The Court explored the conflict between defense witness preclusion
and the Sixth Amendment right to present a defense in Taylor v. Illi-
nois.162 In Taylor, the trial court excluded an important defense witness
whose name had not been disclosed to the State until after the trial be-
gan.163 The Supreme Court, in rejecting the defense argument that the
preclusion sanction is unconstitutional per se, discussed the judicial role
                                                                                                         
156. Id. at 302.
157. See, e.g., Washington, 388 U.S. at 23 n.21 (referring to exclusion of evidence under
testimonial privileges such as attorney-client privilege).
158. The Compulsory Process Clause of the Sixth Amendment provides that “[i]n all
criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to have compulsory process for
obtaining witnesses in his favor . . . .” U.S. CONST. AMEND. VI.
159. 388 U.S. at 18; see also Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, 480 U.S. 39, 56 (1987) (stating that
“[o]ur cases establish, at a minimum, that criminal defendants have the right . . . to put before
a jury evidence that might influence the determination of guilt”); Craig M. Bradley, Havens,
Jenkins, and Salvucci, The Defendant’s Right To Testify, 18 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 419 (1981)
(outlining history of the Compulsory Process Clause).
160. See Washington, 388 U.S. at 18.
161. United States v. Nobles, 422 U.S. 225 (1975). In Nobles, the defense lawyer’s investigator
interviewed certain key prosecution witnesses prior to trial. During the trial, defense counsel sought
to impeach those prosecution witnesses’ in-court testimony by calling the investigator to the stand to
testify to certain prior inconsistent statements. After an in-camera hearing excising matters irrelevant
to the witnesses’ statements, the Nobles court said that the investigator’s report had to be given to the
prosecution after the investigator’s testimony. When defense counsel stated that it did not intend to
produce the report, the court ruled that the investigator could not testify about the conversations with
the prosecution witnesses. Upholding the preclusion sanction, the United States Supreme Court stated
that “one cannot invoke the Sixth Amendment as a justification for presenting what might have been a
half-truth.” Id. at 241.
162. 484 U.S. 400 (1988).
163. Id. at 403.
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in ensuring the reliability of evidence admitted at trial.164 Justice Stevens,
writing for the majority, commented, “It is . . . reasonable to presume that
there is something suspect about a defense witness who is not identified until
after the 11th hour has passed.”165 Justice Stevens stated that the Sixth
Amendment does not “allow presumptively perjured testimony to be pre-
sented to a jury;”166 the “mere invocation of that right [the right to offer the
testimony of witnesses in a defendant’s behalf] cannot automatically and in-
variably outweigh countervailing public interests.”167 He called for balance
and said that the “integrity of the adversary process, which depends both on
the presentation of reliable evidence and the rejection of unreliable evidence,
the interest in the fair and efficient administration of justice, and the potential
prejudice to the truth-determining function of the trial process must also weigh
in the balance.”168
The defense argued that it was unconstitutional to apply the preclusion
sanction in Taylor because the State was not unduly prejudiced since the “voir
dire examination of [the precluded defense witness by the State] adequately
protected the prosecution from any possible prejudice resulting from sur-
prise.”169 But the Court grounded its opinion on the willfulness of the viola-
tion.170 It stated that “[m]ore is at stake than possible prejudice to the prosecu-
tion”171 and that this case “fits into the category of willful misconduct in
which the severest sanction is appropriate.”172 Justice Stevens, in expressing
concern for the State’s ability to rebut testimony such as that of a surprise de-
fense witness, said that if the party’s explanation of the discovery violation re-
vealed that the “omission was willful and motivated by a desire to obtain a
tactical advantage that would minimize the effectiveness of cross-examination
and the ability to adduce rebuttal evidence, it would be entirely consistent with
the purposes of the Compulsory Process Clause simply to exclude the wit-
ness’[s] testimony.”173
The Court said that “[o]ne of the purposes of the discovery rule itself is to
minimize the risk that fabricated testimony will be believed . . . . If a pattern
of discovery violations is explicable only on the assumption that the 
violations were designed to conceal a plan to present fabricated testimony,
                                                                                                         
164. Id. at 410-16; Lori Ann Irish, Alibi Notice Rules: The Preclusion Sanction as Proce-
dural Default, 51 U. CHI. L. REV. 254, 256 (1984) (arguing that use of the preclusion sanction
for a violation of alibi notice rules is not a “denial of a constitutional right but merely the con-
sequence of a defendant’s failure [timely] to assert the constitutional right [to testify/present an
alibi] at the appropriate point in the litigation”).
165. Taylor, 484 U.S. at 414.
166. Id. at 416.
167. Id. at 414.
168. Id. at 415.
169. Id. at 416.
170. Id.
171. Id.
172. Id. at 417.
173. Id. at 415.
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it would be entirely appropriate to exclude the tainted evidence regardless
of whether other sanctions would also be merited.”174
The Court also stated that the defendant in Taylor could be punished
for the actions of his lawyer because “the client has a duty to be candid
and forthcoming with the lawyer, and when the lawyer responds, he or
she speaks for the client.”175 The Court explained that “[t]he adversary
process could not function effectively if every tactical decision required
client approval.”176 Besides, the Court stated, the “protections afforded by
the attorney-client privilege” would make it “highly impracticable to re-
quire an investigation into their relative responsibilities before applying
the sanction of preclusion.”177 As Justice Stevens memorably stated,
“Whenever a lawyer makes use of the sword provided by the Compulsory
Process Clause, there is some risk that he may wound his own client.”178
The defendant in Taylor also argued that preclusion was unconstitu-
tional because less drastic sanctions were available.179 The Court agreed
with the defendant but said that other sanctions would be “less effec-
tive.”180
Courts and commentators have variously criticized or applauded Tay-
lor and its constitutional approval of the application of the preclusion
sanction even in the presence of less drastic measures that would have
been both viable and effective in minimizing the prejudice to the State.181
                                                                                                         
174. Id. at 414.
175. Id. at 418. But see Jim Essig, Preclusion: Procedural Efficiency and the Right To
Defend, 27 HOUS. L. REV. 327, 393 (1990) (arguing that the use of preclusion in Taylor’s
case was “especially severe and disproportionate” because there was “no evidence that Ray
Taylor participated in his attorney’s infraction” and that lesser sanctions, such as fining Tay-
lor’s lawyer or instituting disciplinary proceedings, were more appropriate).
176. Taylor, 484 U.S. at 418.
177. Id.
178. Id.
179. Id. at 413. Possible alternative sanctions would include granting a continuance to the
State; prohibiting further pretrial discovery for a defendant who fails to give proper notice in
listing a witness; permitting comment to the jury on the validity of the surprise witness; crimi-
nal sanctions for a willful failure; contempt sanctions against the lawyer; and initiation of dis-
ciplinary proceedings against the lawyer. See id.; see also Irish, supra note 164, at 256
(arguing that these sanctions, if applied for a notice of alibi violation, would be ineffective and
that the sanction of commenting to the jury on the validity of a surprise alibi is of “doubtful consti-
tutionality”).
180. Taylor, 484 U.S. at 413.
181. See, e.g., Essig, supra note 175, at 394-95 (stating that the Taylor Court’s rationale,
although based upon the presumptive unreliability of the evidence, was inconsistent with
precedent emphasizing the jury’s role in deciding credibility of evidence). But see United
States v. Cervone, 907 F.2d 332, 346 (2d Cir. 1990) (upholding witness preclusion for a six-
month delay in complying with a discovery rule and citing Taylor for the proposition that
“procedural rules for [the] adversary process limit [a] defendant’s right to present exculpatory
evidence”); Chappee v. Vose, 843 F.2d 25, 28 (1st Cir. 1988) (stating that an accused’s right
to compulsory process may be limited if he has figuratively “thumbed his nose at applicable
requirements of pretrial discovery”).
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But Taylor did not deal with the preclusion of defense mitigation testi-
mony in the penalty phase of a capital case.
Perhaps the real key to the constitutionality of the use of Rule
3.202(e)’s preclusion sanction is whether preclusion is necessary to ensure
the reliability, integrity, and trustworthiness of mental health testimony.
Taylor, in that respect, can be used as precedent to justify preclusion of
mental health experts for the defendant’s refusing the State’s compulsory
examination.
The testimony of defense mental health experts is of questionable reli-
ability in the absence of the State’s rebuttal examination,182 and the defen-
dant should not get to use his mental health experts without submitting to
the State’s examination. Neither the State’s ability to sit in the courtroom
while the defense experts testify nor its ability to depose defense experts
ensures the reliability of the defense evidence in the way that an examina-
tion of the defendant would.183 The State’s ability to cross-examine the de-
fense experts also fails to ensure reliability of defense experts.184
Assuming that a capital defendant is sane, his refusal to be examined
by the State doctors is willful in the Taylor sense. He did, after all, agree
to be examined by his own experts. Therefore, his refusal to be examined
by the State’s doctors can only be willful.
 There are less drastic sanctions available to the State in the penalty-
phase refusal situation, such as holding the defendant in contempt or issu-
ing refusals or limiting instructions,185 but, as discussed earlier, they are
less effective than preclusion.186 The danger of relying upon unreliable
testimony is just as real in the penalty phase when the defendant does not
testify and uses his expert as a conduit for his un-cross-examined testi-
mony as it is when a lawyer lists a witness at the “11th hour.”
Taylor was not a death case, but its “11th hour” reliability statement
has been cited by the United States Supreme Court in Herrera v. Col-
lins,187 a death case involving a stay of execution.188 In Herrera, the de-
fendant sought federal habeas corpus relief based upon a claim of actual
innocence.189 The actual innocence claim was based on newly discovered
evidence, consisting of affidavits showing someone other than the defen-
dant committed the capital murder.190 The district court granted a stay of
                                                                                                         
182. See supra part II.
183. See Burns v. State, 609 So. 2d 600, 606 (Fla. 1992) (allowing State expert to remain
in courtroom during defense experts’ testimony was proper when this was only avenue avail-
able for State to offer meaningful expert testimony because defendant was not at that time in
Florida required to submit to the State’s examination).
184. See supra part II.D.
185. See supra part IV.
186. See Taylor v. Illinois, 484 U.S. 400, 413 (1988).
187. 506 U.S. 390 (1993).
188. Id. at 418.
189. Id. at 417-18.
190. Id.
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execution pending an evidentiary hearing.191 The State appealed, and the
circuit court vacated the stay.192 The defendant then sought certiorari re-
view in the United States Supreme Court.193 Chief Justice Rehnquist,
writing for the Court, affirmed the circuit court.194 The Chief Justice ob-
served that the newly discovered evidence consisted of affidavits; he
stated that motions based solely upon affidavits are disfavored because the
affiant’s statements are obtained without cross-examination.195 The Court
noted that the new witness gave the affidavits more than eight years after
the petitioner’s trial.196 The Court had heard no satisfactory explanation as
to why the affiant waited until the 11th hour, even after the alleged perpe-
trator of the murders himself was dead, to make his statements.197
A defendant’s willful conduct in refusing the State’s examination cre-
ates a tactical advantage. He has insulated his story from effective testing,
and he has minimized the effectiveness of the State’s cross-examination of
the defense experts. When asked to justify their conclusions, defense ex-
perts might simply say their opinions are based on the actions and state-
ments of the defendant during their examinations. The defendant has
minimized the State’s ability to adduce rebuttal evidence because the State
and its experts were not present during the defense expert’s examination,
the examination was not videotaped, and the State was not given an ex-
amination of its own. As a result, the State is left with whatever facts the
defense experts offered.
If the decision to refuse the examination is the defense lawyer’s, and
not the capital defendant’s, the defendant is bound by his lawyer’s use of
that Sixth Amendment shield.198 If the defendant refuses the examination,
and the refusal is due to the defendant’s insanity, preclusion in an insanity
context is still constitutional under the Sixth Amendment.199 The defendant
                                                                                                         
191. Herrera v. Collins, No. M-92-30 (S.D. Tex. 1990).
192. Herrera v. Collins, 954 F.2d 1029 (5th Cir. 1992).
193. Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 397 (1993).
194. Id. at 393.
195. Id.
196. Id.
197. Id. at 417-18.
198. See Taylor v. Illinois, 484 U.S. 400, 418 (1988).
199. Some argue that this state of the law exists because the United States Supreme Court
has yet to hold that there is a constitutional right to raise an insanity defense, and at least one
state has abolished the defense. See Parkin v. Florida, 238 So. 2d 817, 822 (Fla. 1970) (stating
that there is no constitutional right to plead not guilty by reason of insanity); Leland v. Ore-
gon, 343 U.S. 790 (1952) (upholding an Oregon statute placing the burden of proving insanity
beyond a reasonable doubt on the defendant).
Courts have interpreted Leland differently during the past forty years. Compare State v. By-
ers, 861 P.2d 860, 866 (Mont. 1993) (holding that a state can deny the insanity defense alto-
gether) with California v. Skinner, 704 P.2d 752, 758 (Cal. 1985) (holding that Leland still re-
quires some form of the insanity defense). But see Hayes v. Michigan, 364 N.W. 2d 635, 639
(Mich. 1984) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (stating that “[w]e are also persuaded by the argument
that there is no constitutional right to assert an insanity defense”); Powell v. Texas, 392 U.S.
514, 536 (1968) (stating that “[n]othing could be less fruitful than for this Court to be impelled
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in Taylor was totally innocent, and he still had to pay for the sins of his
lawyer. Surely the insane are not entitled to any greater constitutional
protection than the innocent.
In Washington v. Texas200 and Rock v. Arkansas,201 trial courts uncon-
stitutionally precluded whole classes of evidence: an accomplice’s testi-
mony in Washington202 and hypnotically refreshed testimony in Rock.203
Can Washington and Rock be used as authority for a court to preclude a
defendant’s penalty-phase mental health experts when the defendant re-
fuses to be examined by the State’s experts? No. In Washington and Rock,
there were no procedural prerequisites that the defendants could have
followed that would have caused the precluded evidence to be admitted.204
In the penalty phase, the defendant can have evidence admitted by com-
plying with the State’s constitutionally permissible compulsory examina-
tion, just as the defendant in Nobles could have had his testimony admit-
ted into evidence by producing the investigator’s report to the court for an
in camera hearing.205
C.   Preclusion of Defense Experts in Insanity Cases
For a defendant to raise the insanity defense, he must be examined by
medical experts, usually psychiatrists or psychologists.206 During this ex-
amination, the defendant usually tells the experts his version of the facts
of the crime.207 Based upon that version, the expert may opine that the de-
fendant is, or was, insane.208 At this point, the expert is listed by the de-
fense to appear as a witness at trial.209 If, however, the defense expert
does not offer the opinion that the defense seeks or expects, another de-
                                                                                                         
into defining some sort of insanity test in constitutional terms”); Note, The Fifth Amendment
and Compelled Psychiatric Examinations: Implications of Estelle v. Smith, 50 GEO. WASH. L.
REV. 275, 291 (1982); Stephanie C. Stimpson, State v. Cowan: The Consequences of Mon-
tana’s Abolition of the Insanity Defense, 55 MONT. L. REV. 503, 517 n.113 (1994).
Even if the insanity defense can be constitutionally abolished, the state must still prove every
element of a criminal offense, including intent, beyond a reasonable doubt, and that burden of
proof cannot be lessened. See In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970). But see State ex rel. Green
v. Boyd, 355 So. 2d 789 (Fla. 1978) (discussing how some states eliminated the insanity de-
fense in the guilt phase of a criminal trial, yet maintained the State’s burden of proof by pre-
serving the defendant’s right to present noninsanity lack-of-intent evidence during the guilt
phase).
200. 388 U.S. 14 (1967).
201. 483 U.S. 44 (1987).
202. 388 U.S. at 23.
203. 483 U.S. at 56.
204. Washington, 388 U.S. at 16; Rock, 483 U.S. at 53.
205. See U.S. v. Nobles, 422 U.S. 225 (1975).
206. Cobb Interview, supra note 18.
207. Id.
208. Id.
209. See, e.g., FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.220 (d)(1)(A).
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fense expert may be called to examine the defendant.210 Even though sev-
eral experts may interview the defendant, the defense is not required to
tell the State about them if it does not expect to call those experts as wit-
nesses at trial.211
Therefore, defense attorneys can have experts examine the defendant
repeatedly until they find the testimony they want. The attorney-client
privilege and the work-product doctrine insulate the defendant from the
prosecution’s awareness that several experts were interviewed before the
defense found an expert who would testify favorably for the defense. If
the defense finds an expert who supports the insanity plea and it intends to
call the expert at trial, the defense must provide the name, address, and
substance of the witness’s testimony to the State.212 Once the defense an-
nounces its list of expert witnesses, one of three things will occur at trial
in presenting the defense: (1) the defendant will testify, but not the ex-
perts;213 (2) the experts will testify, but not the defendant;214 or (3) both
the defendant and the experts will testify.215
Of these options, usually the defense experts testify, but not the defen-
dant.216 This is safer for the accused because his story is related to the jury
by a professional witness and he can avoid cross-examination by the
prosecution.217 Additionally, a poor persuader can be exchanged for an
expert who is a good persuader.218
The State must rebut the defense of insanity.219 There are four ways in
which the State may prepare to rebut the defense expert’s opinion that the
defendant was insane at the time the crime was committed.220 First, the
prosecutor could depose or interview the defense doctors, if such discov-
                                                                                                         
210. Cobb Interview, supra note 18.
211. Id.; see FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.220(d)(1)(A) (requiring that the defense list only a wit-
ness it expects to call to testify at trial.)
212. See FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.216(c).
213. Cobb Interview, supra note 18; see generally White, infra note 218 (explaining the
advantages the defense has in substituting an expert witness in place of the defendant to testify
at trial).




218. Id. For an example of how this is an advantage for the defense, see Welsh S. White,
The Psychiatric Examination and the Fifth Amendment Privilege in Capital Cases, 74 J. CRIM.
L. & CRIMINOLOGY 943, 961 (1983).
219. See, e.g., Parkin v. State, 238 So. 2d 817, 821 (Fla. 1970). The court stated that
[i]t is a cornerstone of a workable system of criminal law that every person is pre-
sumed sane, and capable of controlling their actions and being held responsible for
these actions. Obviously this is only a presumption, and may be overcome. When the
presumption of sanity is rebutted, then the state must prove sanity beyond every rea-
sonable doubt, just as it must other elements of the offense.
Id. (citations omitted).
220. Telephone Interview with Mike McMillan, Chief Assistant Public Defender, Clearwa-
ter, Fla. (June 8, 1995).
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ery is permitted.221 The State doctor would then use this information when
he testifies in the State’s rebuttal case. Second, the State could try to take
the deposition of the defendant or force the defendant to testify at trial as
a predicate for his expert’s testimony.222 Third, a State doctor could sit in
the courtroom when the defense doctor testifies, if the court finds that
preparation a necessary compensation for the inability to examine the de-
fendant.223 Using notes taken during that testimony, the State’s doctor
would be a rebuttal witness following the defendant’s insanity presenta-
tion.224 Fourth, the State could attempt to have the court order the accused
examined by prosecution rebuttal doctors.225
Only the last preparation method mentioned (having the defendant ex-
amined by a doctor for the prosecution) is both constitutional226 and also
gives the State a fair opportunity to rebut the defense of insanity.227 The
problem with the first and third rebuttal preparation methods is that, al-
though they help the State combat the defense testimony in some respect,
they do not attack the root of the problem, which is access to the defen-
dant.228 The defense doctors’ opinions are based upon their examination
and testing of the accused,229 and those opinions are subjective, not objec-
tive.230 The defense doctors are not giving opinions upon such immutable
principles as chemical reactions. When they offer opinions on insanity,
they are basing them upon the mutable principles of the psychiatric ex-
amination. In this regard, a defense doctor’s statement that the defendant is
insane is based, in large part, upon selective statements obtained by the de-
                                                                                                         
221. See FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.220(h) (permitting discovery depositions in felony cases).
222. The defendant has a constitutional right to remain silent and cannot be forced to tes-
tify at trial. See U.S. CONST. amend. V; FLA. CONST. art. I, § 9; see, e.g., Jones v. State,
289 So. 2d 725, 729 (Fla. 1974). In Jones, an insanity defendant was examined by his doctor,
who performed psychological tests on him. Jones, 289 So. 2d at 729. The doctor also received
some historical information from the defendant. Id. Prior to the defense doctor’s testifying, the
State contended that the doctor’s testimony was inadmissible because the defendant had not yet
taken the stand and testified to what he had told his expert. Id. at 725-26. The trial court
agreed with the State. Id. at 728-29. The defendant reluctantly testified and was convicted, but
the Supreme Court reversed the trial court and stated, “In order to use the expert opinion of a
psychiatrist, a defendant should not be required, as a predicate, to take the stand and abridge
his constitutional right against self-incrimination.” Id. at 729.
223. Having a state doctor sit in the courtroom and listen to the defense expert’s testimony
is the common technique used by the prosecution, although it is also acknowledged that having
the State’s doctor examine the defendant in person would be a much more effective method to
prepare for rebuttal. Cobb Interview, supra note 18.
224. Cobb Interview, supra note 18. This rebuttal preparation is inefficient because the de-
fense expert’s testimony may, and usually does, omit several pieces of information that could help
the prosecution if the information were revealed in court. See 1 ZISKIN & FAUST, supra note 24, at
326-29.
225. See supra part II.
226. See United States v. Byers, 740 F.2d 1104, 1114 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
227. See id.
228. See id.
229. Cobb Interview, supra note 18.
230. See supra part II.C. (noting the problems with the reliability of mental health testimony).
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fense expert during the examination of the defendant.231 The defense ex-
pert may have rejected, and not even have written down, certain state-
ments of the accused that might indicate the defendant is sane.232 But, be-
cause there is no requirement that the psychiatric interview be recorded,
the State will never know upon which statements the defense expert is re-
lying and what statements the defense expert is choosing to ignore.233
The second rebuttal preparation method—forcing the defendant to tes-
tify at trial—is clearly unconstitutional because it would violate the defen-
dant’s Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination.234
The fourth method, compulsory examination of the accused, is argua-
bly the best of all four rebuttal preparation methods. It is the one used in
federal courts235 and in most states, including Florida,236 when the defense
raises an insanity defense. With this method, if the defendant (fearing
compulsory examination by the State) agrees to be examined by State
doctors, the State is permitted access to the defendant for examination and
testing. Then, if the State has been allowed to perform an examination,
the State’s doctor will be able to use the State’s examination results to re-
but, if appropriate, defense expert testimony of an insanity diagnosis
based upon defense examination of the accused. Consequently, if the de-
fendant does not refuse the State’s compulsory examination, the State has
a level playing field and a fair opportunity to rebut the defendant’s mental
health defense.
However, there are two reasons the defendant may refuse the State’s
compulsory examination. First, the defendant may refuse because he is
faking or malingering and, by refusing the State’s examination, he is
seeking to evade detection. If this reason is applicable, the State’s rebuttal
examination would be the best method to ferret out such a malingerer.
Second, the defendant may refuse the State’s examination because the
State doctor may thereby obtain information from the defendant that the
                                                                                                         
231. See Byers, 740 F.2d at 1168 (Bazelon, J., dissenting). Judge Bazelon stated that
[t]he same intellectual presuppositions and personal and institutional biases that affect
his or her evaluation of the data also affect his or her conscious or unconscious deci-
sions regarding what sort of behavior to notice, remember, and record . . . . And




233. See id. at 1168 n.184.
234. See supra notes 216-18 and accompanying text.
235. FED. R. CRIM. P. 12.2(c)-(d).
236. Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.216(d) states, in relevant part, that “[o]n the
filing of such notice the court may on its own motion, and shall on motion of the state or the
defendant, order that the defendant be examined . . . .” FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.216(d).
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prosecutor can use against the defendant in the case on trial or in bringing
other charges. That reason is problematic, but solvable.237
If the defendant refuses the State’s compulsory examination, the court
may constitutionally preclude the defendant’s experts from testifying that
the defendant was insane at the time of the crime.238 There may be a
hearing as to whether the defendant’s conduct constitutes a refusal,239 but
once it is determined that there was a refusal, preclusion is automatic in
Florida.240 If the defendant refuses to be examined by a State doctor, the
court will use the preclusion sanction to protect the reliability of the evi-
                                                                                                         
237. See, e.g., Lovette v. State, 636 So. 2d 1304, 1308 (Fla. 1994) (stating that the prose-
cution cannot “elicit specific facts about a crime learned by a confidential expert through an
examination of a defendant unless that defendant waives the attorney/client privilege by calling
the expert to testify and opens the inquiry to collateral issues”); McMunn v. State, 264 So. 2d
868, 870 (Fla. 1st DCA 1972) (holding that it is reversible error for State to question a court-
appointed doctor about a defendant’s incriminating statements and stating that “a psychiatrist is
not permitted to testify directly as to facts elicited from a defendant during the course of com-
pulsory examination”). But see State v. Whitlow, 210 A.2d 763, 770 (N.J. 1965) (stating that
any prejudice from admission of testimony about the facts and circumstances of offense could
be cured by limiting instruction); Vardas v. Estelle, 715 F.2d 206, 210 (5th Cir. 1983) (citing
United States v. Albright, 388 F.2d 719 (4th Cir. 1968)). The Vardas court stated that where
issue is mental incapacity because of sociopathic personality, a complete psychiatric examina-
tion necessarily involves discussion of the defendant’s participation, if any, in acts charged and
past criminal conduct, if any. 715 F.2d at 210. Adequate disclosure of the basis for a medical
opinion to the trier of fact would require disclosure of the patient’s conversation, including
admissions. Id. In other types of cases, a psychiatrist may be able to avoid these sensitive areas
and still reach a certain opinion. Id. If the testimony of State experts is offered solely in rebut-
tal to a defense of insanity and is properly limited to that issue, a defendant’s Fifth Amendment
rights are not violated. Id. But see supra notes 141-43 (referencing the ineffectiveness of limit-
ing instructions).
238. See, e.g., Minnesota v. Richards, 495 N.W.2d 187, 199 (Minn. 1992) (holding that
the “defendant was not denied his constitutional right to due process of law by sanctions pre-
cluding his presentation of evidence on the mental illness defense where he refused to cooper-
ate with the psychiatrist appointed to assist him and chose not to comply with discovery
rules”); Henry v. State, 574 So. 2d 66, 70 (Fla. 1991) (concluding that the trial judge did not
abuse his discretion in striking the defense of insanity upon the defendant’s failure to cooperate
with [State] psychiatrist); Michigan v. Hayes, 364 N.W.2d 635, 640 (Mich. 1984) (stating that
“the preclusion of testimony on the basis of a failure to cooperate is not too harsh a sanction”);
Parkin v. State, 238 So. 2d 817, 822 (Fla. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 974 (1971) (stating
that “[t]he defendant’s right at trial to offer evidence on the issue of his sanity at the time of
the alleged crime is conditioned upon his cooperation during a psychiatric examination on be-
half of the prosecution or court”); Bannister v. State, 358 So. 2d 1182, 1184 (Fla. 2d DCA
1978) (stating that “in appropriate circumstances, such as total noncooperation with any psy-
chiatrist save his own, the court may properly refuse to admit any evidence propounded by the
defendant relevant to the issue of his sanity”) (citing McMunn v. State, 264 So. 2d 868 (Fla.
1st DCA 1972)).
239. A question may arise as to whether the defendant refused the State’s exam if, for ex-
ample, the defendant, during the State’s rebuttal exam, answered some, but not all, of the State
doctor’s questions. See, e.g., State v. Williams, 742 P.2d 1352 (Ariz. 1987) (stating that de-
spite the defendant’s uncooperative and evasive responses, he did not “refuse to be examined”
and, therefore, was examined and found to be malingering to avoid criminal prosecution; the
trial court did not err in allowing the defendant’s expert witness to testify on the issue of in-
sanity).
240. See supra notes 50-51 and accompanying text.
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dence.241 The reason the defendant refused to be examined has no bearing
on the court’s decision to impose the preclusion sanction.
But, why is it necessary for a court to preclude the defendant’s experts
from testifying when the defendant refuses the State’s examination? Although
the Florida Supreme Court has grounded the need for preclusion in fair-
ness to the State,242 other states have gone further and based preclusion
also on the need to ensure the reliability of defense mental health evi-
dence.243
In Michigan v. Hayes,244 a defendant, intending to raise an insanity de-
fense, refused to cooperate sufficiently to allow a State doctor to form an
opinion on his sanity.245 The trial court barred the defendant from offering
evidence of insanity.246 The Michigan Supreme Court, in rejecting the
Hayes defendant’s Sixth Amendment argument, stated that “the accused
must comply with ‘established rules of procedure and evidence designed
to assure both fairness and reliability in the ascertainment of guilt and in-
nocence.’”247 The Hayes court rejected the traditional balancing approach
in deciding which sanction to apply for discovery violations and upheld
the use of the preclusion sanction when the integrity of the evidence has
been threatened.248
The Hayes court drew a distinction between a discovery order and a
compulsory examination order.249 It held that “‘discovery orders are de-
signed to prevent surprise, not to protect the integrity of evidence sought
to be presented.’”250 The court then stated that compliance with Michi-
gan’s compulsory examination statute “is essential to the integrity of the
evidence of insanity.”251
The Hayes court concluded that the Michigan statute “does not un-
constitutionally infringe on a defendant’s right to present a defense.”252
The court rejected a balancing approach to the problem “as unworkable in
the present context . . . [and stated that the] preclusion sanction of the
                                                                                                         
241. See, e.g., infra notes 244-53 and accompanying text.
242. See Henry v. State, 574 So. 2d 66, 70 (1991) (reasoning that “[t]he prosecution bears
the burden of proving sanity beyond a reasonable doubt. If a defendant seeks to pursue an in-
sanity defense, the State should have an equal opportunity to obtain evidence relevant to that
issue”).
243. See, e.g., infra notes 244-53 and accompanying text.
244. 364 N.W.2d 635 (Mich. 1984).
245. Id. at 638 n.3.
246. Id. at 637.
247. Id. at 639 (quoting Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 302 (1973)).
248. Id. at 640.
249. Id. at 639.
250. Id. at 640 (quoting State v. Davis, 639 F.2d 239, 243 (5th Cir. 1986)).
251. Id.
252. Id.
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statute is an appropriate means of protecting the integrity, accuracy, and
credibility of evidence of insanity.”253
Clearly, the preclusion sanction is effective in leveling the playing
field between the State and the defense in insanity cases, and it preserves
the integrity and reliability of a State court’s trial evidence. However, is it
constitutional to use the preclusion sanction in a capital case when a de-
fendant refuses the state’s penalty-phase compulsory examination? Can a
capital trial judge preclude defense experts from testifying in the penalty
phase in order to protect the integrity and reliability of mental health
mitigation evidence, or is the reliability standard applicable only to insan-
ity cases? In the latter situation, after all, the issue is only guilt or inno-
cence. In the former, it is a question of life or death.254
D.   Preclusion of Expert Witnesses in the Penalty Phase
There is no Fifth Amendment violation when an insanity defendant is
subjected to compulsory examination by the State’s doctors;255 but does a
penalty-phase compulsory examination violate a defendant’s privilege
against compelled self-incrimination when the defendant attempts to in-
troduce his own mental health expert testimony? The United States Su-
preme Court has answered this question in the negative.256 The Florida
Supreme Court, in Dillbeck v. State,257 followed the United States Su-
preme Court. The Dillbeck defendant claimed that the trial court had vio-
lated his Fifth Amendment right against compelled self-incrimination by
requiring him to submit to an examination by the State’s mental health
expert before the penalty phase.258 Florida’s high court, without specifi-
cally mentioning the Fifth Amendment, stated, “[W]e cannot say that the
trial court abused its discretion in striving to level the playing field by or-
dering Dillbeck to submit to a pre-penalty phase interview with the State’s
expert . . . . No truly objective tribunal can compel one side in a legal
                                                                                                         
253. Id. at 640-41.
254. Eighth Amendment jurisprudence is the context within which death penalty cases are
decided, and the linchpin of that analysis is that death as a punishment is different. See, e.g.,
Daniel R. Harris, Capital Sentencing After Walton v. Arizona: A Retreat from the “Death Is
Different Doctrine,” 40 AM. U. L. REV. 1389, 1389 (1991) (stating that “[t]he underlying as-
sumption of modern Eighth Amendment jurisprudence can be summarized simply: death is dif-
ferent”); Kaplan, supra note 15, at 372 (citing Justice Burger’s acknowledgement in Lockett v.
Ohio that “death is different” and noting that his view was shared, as of 1983, by every Justice
other than Justice Rehnquist) (citation omitted).
255. See United States v. Byers, 740 F.2d 1104, 1115 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (stating that “we
reject appellant’s claim that his privilege against compelled self-incrimination was denied . . . .
We hold that when a defendant raises the defense of insanity, he may constitutionally be sub-
jected to compulsory examination by court-appointed or government psychiatrists.”).
256. See Estelle v. Smith, 451 U.S. 454, 465, 468 (1981).
257. 643 So. 2d 1027 (Fla. 1994).
258. Id. at 1030.
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bout to abide by the Marquis of Queensberry’s rules, while the other
fights ungloved.”259
The defendant in Dillbeck complied with the trial court’s compulsory
examination order and was examined. A capital defendant’s reasons for
refusing are analogous to the reasons defendants would refuse compulsory
examinations in the insanity context, and the discussion there applies
here. As the discussion in part IV.C indicates, the State’s expert opinions
could be sanitized and portions could be excised before they are transmitted
to the jury. The court could admit the evidence with a limiting instruction,
grant a continuance so that the defendant could rebut any probative evi-
dence,260 or admit evidence that independently establishes aggravating cir-
cumstances on the theory that the defendant chose to take that risk in raising
a mental health defense. When, in this regard, a defendant presents a mental
health defense by proxy, that is, through an expert, and does not take the
stand to lay the predicate for the expert’s opinion, the State’s examination is
the closest the State can come to being able to cross-examine the defendant.
If the defendant takes the stand, the State may, on cross-examination, bring
out facts, other than evidence of charged and uncharged crimes, that would
help the State prove the elements of the crime charged. The exercise of the
right to testify, or, for that matter, to present mental health mitigation, is
“not a pathway without stones.”261
There is another reason a penalty-phase capital defendant may refuse the
penalty-phase compulsory examination. If a capital defendant wishes to
challenge preclusion for refusing a penalty-phase compulsory examination
as unconstitutional, the defendant could use refusal of the examination as a
means to manipulate the death penalty process. The defendant, in this re-
gard, with little bona fide expert mental health mitigation testimony or any
other mitigation evidence, but with several aggravating factors, could advise
the court, in accordance with Rule 3.202, that he intends to present mental
health mitigation evidence. The court, pursuant to that Rule, would order
the defendant examined, the defendant would refuse, and the mental health
testimony, which the defendant never really wanted to present anyway,
would be excluded. Because of the existence of several aggravating factors,
and no or fewer mitigating factors, the defendant would be sentenced to
death. The conviction, however, would be reversed, should preclusion be
determined unconstitutional per se. The court would send the case back for
                                                                                                         
259. Id.
260. See FLA. STAT. § 921.142(2) (1995) (addressing what information is admissible in the
penalty-phase sentencing hearing and providing that “[a]ny such evidence which the court deems
to have probative value may be received, regardless of its admissibility under the exclusionary
rules of evidence, provided the defendant is accorded a fair opportunity to rebut any hearsay
statements”).
261. Parkin v. State, 238 So. 2d 817, 821 (Fla. 1970) (stating that “[l]ike the decision to
testify in one’s behalf and risk incrimination during cross-examination, the decision to plead
insanity and tender proof is not a pathway without stones”).
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resentencing and the truth would eventually come out, but the defendant,
who was entitled to essentially no mitigating factors, would have doubled
the time period before imposition of his death sentence. Because the average
time from conviction to execution is eight years,262 the defendant might be
able to stay on Death Row and process his appellate rights for twenty
years, all because penalty-phase preclusion could be challenged as un-
constitutional. But, is mandatory preclusion of a capital defendant’s men-
tal health testimony constitutional when a defendant refuses to comply
with a court-ordered, penalty-phase compulsory examination?
 As previously stated,263 in noncapital cases or when mental health de-
fenses are raised in the guilt phase of a capital case, the defense experts
who examined the defendant can be precluded from testifying if the de-
fendant refuses the State exam.264 The preclusion sanction is very effec-
tive. It gets the desired result. Defendants are examined by prosecution
doctors, and the reliability of mental health testimony is ensured. But, can
the same sanction be applied to coerce the examination of a capital defen-
dant in the context of the penalty phase of a death penalty case? Or, are
there problems in applying the insanity precedent to the sentencing phase
of a capital case?
Prior to 1972, the forty death penalty states inflicted the death penalty
arbitrarily and capriciously because there were no guidelines to establish
who did, or did not, receive a death sentence.265 Receiving the death
penalty was as capricious an event as “being struck by lightning.”266 By
“the mid-twentieth century, every state wishing to employ the death
penalty had turned away from the traditional mandatory death penalty for
first degree murder (or its locally defined equivalent) and instead had
given its juries ungoverned and unreviewable discretion either to impose
the death penalty or to dispense mercy.”267 About the defendant, the jurors
heard no background information other than what they gleaned from the
trial.268 States executed rapists as well as murderers,269 and racial dis-
crimination infected the entire process.270
                                                                                                         
262. See Walton v. Arizona, 497 U.S. 639, 669 (Scalia, J., concurring) (stating that
“[t]hose executions that have been carried out have occurred an average of eight years after the
commission of the capital crime”).
263. See supra notes 51, 61 and accompanying text.
264. See supra notes 51, 61 and accompanying text.
265. See Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 293 (1972) (Brennan, J., concurring); Scott
E. Sundby, The Lockett Paradox: Reconciling Guided Discretion and Unguided Mitigation in
Capital Sentencing, 38 UCLA  L. REV. 1147, 1151 (1991).
266. Furman, 408 U.S. at 309 (Stewart, J., concurring).
267. Louis D. Bilionis, Moral Appropriateness, Capital Punishment, and the Lockett Doc-
trine, 82 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 283, n.15 (1991).   
268. See Harris, supra note 254, at 1394.
269. See, e.g., Furman, 408 U.S. at 308-309 (Stewart, J., concurring).
270. See Joshua N. Sondheimer, Note, A Continuing Source of Aggravation: The Improper
Consideration of Mitigating Factors in Death Penalty Sentencing, 41 HASTINGS L.J. 409, 413
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Because of these inequities, the United States Supreme Court, in Fur-
man v. Georgia,271 struck down every death penalty statute in the na-
tion.272 Beginning with Furman, the Court embarked on a constitutional
odyssey comparable to the one spawned by Brown v. Board of Education
of Topeka, Kansas.273 As Brown plunged the Equal Protection Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment into segregated schools, Furman drove the
Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause of the Eighth Amendment into the
heart of each death penalty statute.
Although the Furman plurality gave no guidance to the states as to
what was a constitutionally valid death penalty statute,274 the Court has
made it clear that “death is different.”275 Because death is different, a
capital sentencer’s discretion to impose, or not impose, the death penalty
must be guided.276 The guidance provided by the plurality was a system of
aggravating and mitigating circumstances. The aggravating circumstances
help sentencers determine which are the worst crimes and, hence, more
deserving of a death sentence. The mitigating circumstances help sentenc-
ers determine which defendants are most affected by mitigating circum-
stances and, hence, more deserving of a life sentence. Therefore, the
courts achieved guided discretion by identifying the most unmitigated de-
fendants who committed the most aggravated capital crimes. Subsequent
Eighth Amendment jurisprudence added the requirement of individualized
sentencing.277 A valid death sentence could not be based upon a proceed-
ing that excluded as mitigation anything the defendant chose to present
that would call for a sentence less than death.278 Woodson v. North Caro-
lina279 reaffirmed the fact that death is different;280 and Lockett v. Ohio281
                                                                                                         
(1990) (referring to pre-Furman discrimination by capital sentencers against nonwhite defen-
dants); Samuel R. Gross, Race & Death: The Judicial Evaluation of Evidence of Discrimina-
tion in Capital Sentencing, 18 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1275, 1282-84 (1985).
271. 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
272. Harris, supra note 254, at 1390.
273. 329 U.S. 294 (1955); see generally Lewis F. Powell, Jr., Stare Decisis and Judicial
Restraint, 47 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 281 (1990); Sundby, supra note 265.
274. See Harris, supra note 254, at 1396.
275. See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 188 (1976) (stating that “[w]hile Furman did
not hold that the infliction of the death penalty per se violates the Constitution’s ban on cruel
and unusual punishments, it did recognize that the penalty of death is different in kind from
any other punishment imposed under our system of criminal justice”); see also Harris, supra
note 254, at 1389.
276. See Sundby, supra note 265, at 1151.
277. See id. at 1157-59; Harris, supra note 254, at 1403-05.
278. See Sundby, supra note 265, at 1160; Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 113-15
(1982) (reversing death sentence because a defendant’s youth and mental problems were not
thought to be explicitly covered by the State’s death penalty law).
279. 428 U.S. 280 (1976).
280. Id. at 305.
The penalty of death is qualitatively different from a sentence of imprisonment, how-
ever long. Death, in its finality, differs more from life imprisonment than a 100-year
prison term differs from one of only a year or two. Because of that qualitative differ-
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established a capital defendant’s substantive, federally protected Eighth
and Fourteenth Amendment constitutional rights to present anything in
mitigation that might call for a sentence less than death.282
Although the United States Supreme Court has not addressed the con-
stitutionality of the use of a penalty-phase preclusion sanction, it has de-
cided two cases establishing bright-line rules that courts may use to decide
what evidence must be constitutionally admitted in the penalty phase of a
capital case and what evidence may be constitutionally excluded or pre-
cluded.283 These cases have established standards that permit courts to
exclude unreliable mitigating defense evidence because it denies the State
a fair opportunity to test, rebut, or cross-examine the defense evidence.
In the first case, Chambers v. Mississippi,284 a third person orally con-
fessed to three different people that he had committed the murder the de-
fendant was charged with committing.285 The circumstances under which
these “confessions” were made bore substantial assurances of trustworthi-
ness.286 The third person also made, but later repudiated, a written con-
fession.287 The trial court, in the guilt phase of the defense’s case, ex-
cluded, under Mississippi’s hearsay rule, the testimony of the three per-
sons to whom the third person had confessed.288 The defense then called
the third person as a witness, “laid a predicate for the sworn out-of-court
confession, had it admitted into evidence, and read to the jury.”289 During
the State’s cross-examination, the third person testified that he had repu-
diated his prior confession.290 The defense then renewed a prior motion to
examine the third person as an adverse witness.291 Relying on Missis-
                                                                                                         
ence, there is a corresponding difference in the need for reliability in the determina-
tion that death is the appropriate punishment in a specific case.
Id. (citation omitted).
281. 438 U.S. 586 (1978).
282. Id. at 604 (concluding that “the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments require that the
sentencer, in all but the rarest kind of capital case, not be precluded from considering, as a
mitigating factor, any aspect of a defendant’s character or record and any of the circumstances
of the offense that the defendant proffers as a basis for a sentence less than death”); see
Sundby, supra note 265, at 1190. Unlike insanity cases, normal evidentiary rules are loosened
in penalty phase proceedings. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 921.141(1) (1995) (stating that, regard-
ing admissibility of evidence in the penalty phase, “any such evidence which the court deems
to have probative value may be received, regardless of its admissibility under the exclusionary
rules of evidence, provided the defendant is provided a fair opportunity to rebut any hearsay
statements”); see also Kelly, supra note 9, at 411.
283. See Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284 (1973); Green v. Georgia, 442 U.S. 95
(1979).
284. 410 U.S. 284 (1973).
285. Id. at 289.
286. Id. at 300.
287. Id. at 291.
288. Id. at 289.
289. Id. at 291.
290. Id.
291. Id.
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sippi’s common law voucher rule, the trial court refused to let the defense
do so.292 Justice Powell, writing for the Supreme Court and basing his de-
cision on the Fourteenth Amendment, held that exclusion of this critical evi-
dence, coupled with the State’s refusal to permit the defense to cross-
examine the third person, denied the defendant a trial with traditional,
fundamental due process standards.293 The Court stated that while the ac-
cused must comply with established rules of procedure and evidence to
assure fairness and reliability in ascertaining guilt and innocence,294 “[t]he
testimony rejected by the trial court here bore persuasive assurances of
trustworthiness . . . . [That] testimony also was critical to Chambers’ de-
fense. In these circumstances, where constitutional rights directly affect-
ing the ascertainment of guilt are implicated, the hearsay rule may not be
applied mechanistically to defeat the ends of justice.”295
Chambers, in dealing with a declaration against penal interest in a
murder case, relied on four factors to determine whether proffered evi-
dence was reliable and should be admitted. The four factors were 1) the
spontaneous nature of the statements made to a close acquaintance shortly
after the murder; 2) other evidence corroborating the statements; 3) the
nature of the statements as self-incriminatory and unquestionably against
interest; and 4) the unavailability of the declarant for cross-examination.296
In the second case, Green v. Georgia,297 the defendant, at the penalty
phase of his capital trial, sought to prove that he was not present when his
co-defendant shot the victim.298 He attempted to introduce the testimony
of another witness, who had testified for the State at the co-defendant’s
trial.299 According to the new witness’s testimony, the co-defendant con-
fided to him that the co-defendant had shot the victim twice after ordering
the defendant to run an errand.300 The trial court excluded the testimony
under the hearsay provision of Georgia’s evidence code.301 Stating that
substantial reasons existed to assume the reliability of the co-defendant’s
confession to the new witness,302 the plurality, citing Lockett, held that the
excluded testimony was highly relevant to a critical issue in the punish-
ment phase of the trial and that its exclusion constituted a violation of the
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.303 The Green Court
held that highly relevant and reliable evidence could not be excluded from
                                                                                                         
292. Id. at 294.
293. Id. at 302.
294. Id.
295. Id.
296. Id. at 300-01.
297. 442 U.S. 95 (1979).
298. Id. at 96.
299. Id.
300. Id.
301. Id. at 95.
302. Id. at 97.
303. Id.
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the penalty phase by application of a state’s evidence code.304 The Court
relied on four factors in reversing the conviction. The four factors were
(1) the spontaneous nature of the co-defendant’s statement to a close
friend; (2) the fact that evidence corroborating the confession was suffi-
cient to procure a conviction of the co-defendant and a capital sentence;
(3) the nature of the statement as against interest and the absence of a rea-
son to believe the co-defendant had an ulterior motive in making it; and
(4) the State’s consideration of the testimony as sufficiently reliable to use
it against the co-defendant and to base a sentence of death upon it.305 Jus-
tice Blackmun, writing for the Court, quoted Chambers and stated, “In
these unique circumstances, ‘the hearsay rule may not be applied
mechanistically to defeat the ends of justice.’”306
There are two prongs of Chambers, both of which must be met before
there is a due process violation because of exclusion of evidence. The
excluded evidence must be critical to the defense and bear “persuasive as-
surances of trustworthiness.”307 There are also two prongs of Green, both
of which must be met before there is a due process violation because of
exclusion of evidence in the penalty phase of a capital case. The excluded
evidence must be “highly relevant to a critical issue in the punishment
phase,” and “substantial reasons” must exist “to assume its reliability.”308
Defense mental health testimony satisfies the first prongs of both Green
and Chambers because such testimony is critical to the establishment of
mental health mitigation factors. But if such testimony is based upon the
examination, testing, or evaluation of the defendant by his expert, such
evidence, as indicated earlier, is not trustworthy or reliable in the absence
of the State’s reciprocal examination.
While the ability to cross-examine the in-court witness is important in
making constitutionally permissible reliability decisions, as indicated in
both Chambers and Green, the credibility of the out-of-court declarant
and the trustworthiness of that testimony are the constitutionally signifi-
cant factors.
In Green, the Court used the Due Process Clause to trump state evi-
dentiary rules precluding important exculpatory defense evidence. If a
Florida trial judge uses Rule 3.202 to preclude defense experts, the judge
will be using a state court procedural rule to exclude important exculpa-
tory defense evidence, but that is where the analogy to Green ends. In
Green, the Court found the excluded evidence reliable and reasoned that
                                                                                                         
304. Id.
305. Id.
306. Id.; see also supra note 295; McKoy v. North Carolina, 494 U.S. 433, 441 (1990)
(stating that relevant mitigating evidence could not be excluded by applying a “standard of
proof intended to ensure the reliability of mitigating evidence”).
307. Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 302 (1973).
308. Green v. Georgia, 442 U.S. 95, 97 (1979).
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admitting it would also be fair to the State because the State had used the
same testimony to convict the defendant’s co-defendant.309 Moreover, the
defendant did nothing willful to cause the evidentiary dilemma in Green.
He did not, for instance, cause the absence of the hearsay declarant and
then ask to have the declarant’s hearsay statement admitted.310
In both Chambers and Green, the Court found the excluded evidence
reliable.311 In both cases, the State was in a position to rebut the defense
evidence by adequate adversarial testing through a continuance or cross-
examination.
Following Green and Chambers, courts have used the reliability of de-
fense evidence as a benchmark to determine whether such evidence could
be precluded in the penalty phase of a capital case. The reliability concept
is inextricably intertwined with the state’s ability to rebut, contradict, test,
or cross-examine such evidence.
In Martin v. Wainwright,312 the capital defendant’s counsel, at the
penalty phase, sought to introduce portions of the defendant’s jail records,
which would have shown “(1) that [the defendant] was ‘tremulous’ while
in jail, thus indicating that he did not ‘fake’ his tremors during his psy-
chiatric examinations, [and] (2) that he attempted to commit suicide while
in jail . . . .”313 The trial court told defense counsel that the records could
be introduced only if all of the records went in, including those records
relating to defendant’s attack on his parole supervisor.314 Defense counsel
then decided not to introduce any of the records.315 The Eleventh Circuit
upheld the exclusion of the evidence and stated, “Lockett entitles a capital
defendant to introduce all relevant mitigating evidence at sentencing, but
does not entitle the defendant to pick and choose between portions of
documents and records in an attempt to mislead the sentencer.”316
                                                                                                         
309. Id. at 96. The Green Court stated that
Moore made his statement spontaneously to a close friend. The evidence corroborat-
ing the confession was ample, and indeed sufficient to procure a conviction of Moore
and a capital sentence . . . . Perhaps most important, the State considered the testi-
mony sufficiently reliable to use it against Moore, and to base a sentence of death
upon it.
Id. (citation omitted).
310. Id.   
311. See Chambers, 410 U.S. at 289; Green, 442 U.S. at 96.




316. Id. However, the Martin court did note that the “records would have been merely
cumulative evidence on the subject of Martin’s mental condition, a subject already explored in
great detail throughout the trial. Furthermore, Dr. Vaughn, as Martin’s psychiatrist, could
have testified about the antipsychotic medication.” Id. The Martin court addressed the consti-
tutional issue of preclusion by stating that “[e]ven assuming the jail records should have been
admitted at trial, however, such error hardly was of constitutional dimension.” Id. The court
quoted Dickson v. Wainwright, which stated that “[a]n evidentiary error does not justify habeas
relief unless the violation results in a denial of fundamental fairness.” Id. (citation omitted).
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It might be alleged that mandatory preclusion of defense mental health
evidence is an “a priori” determination of the unreliability of certain
classes of evidence317 and that lesser alternative sanctions should be em-
ployed.318 However, the better view is that such considerations do not ap-
ply when a court uses the preclusion sanction because the defendant, not
the court, is excluding evidence.
In Allen v. Morris,319 the Sixth Circuit held that excluding the tran-
script testimony of a defense witness because the defendant failed to exert
his own effort to locate the witness, as required by a state hearsay excep-
tion,320 did not violate the defendant’s due process right to present defense
evidence in the guilt phase of his murder trial.321 The defendant relied on
Green and Chambers and asserted that preclusion of the transcript testi-
                                                                                                         
Martin could have gotten the records he wanted into evidence, but only on the condition that he
put all of the records in, both pro and con, because, as the Martin court stated, if he did not
put all his records in, the jury would be misled. Likewise, a capital defendant can get his
mental health mitigation evidence before the sentencing jury, but he must present all the po-
tentially available evidence. He cannot put on the testimony of his experts that is based on their
examination, testing, or evaluation of him and refuse to submit to the State’s reciprocal exami-
nation. Such testimony would be unreliable and would mislead the jury. However, can the de-
fendant complain of a denial of fundamental fairness? Did not his own willful act of refusing
the State’s examination (which examination is the State’s equivalent of being able to cross-
examine the defendant) put him in the very predicament of which he now complains?
317. The “a priori” determination of the presumptive unreliability of whole classes of evi-
dence is constitutionally prohibited. See, e.g., Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14 (1967). In
Washington, the defendant was charged with a murder in which another man, Fuller, had par-
ticipated. Id. at 15. Fuller was convicted at a separate trial. Id. at 16. Washington tried to call
Fuller to testify at his trial. Fuller would have testified that Washington tried to get Fuller to
leave the scene and that Washington left the scene before Fuller fired the fatal shot. Id.
Fuller’s testimony was excluded under a statute that prohibited any co-participant from testify-
ing on behalf of his co-participant. Id. at 17. The rule was purportedly premised on the fact
that accomplices would be inclined to lie in order to get each other acquitted. Id. at 21.
318. See, e.g., Dutton v. Brown, 812 F.2d 593, 601 (10th Cir. 1987). The court held that
it was error to exclude mitigating evidence offered through defendant’s mother based on the
mother’s violation of a sequestration order, and stated that
[a]ssuming the exclusion order properly applied to the sentencing proceeding, the
trial court had the discretion to select means other than the exclusion of Mrs. Dut-
ton’s testimony to enforce the sequestration order. For example, it could have al-
lowed Mrs. Dutton to testify and then instructed the jury that she was present during
the guilt proceeding. That approach would have permitted the jury to assess the wit-
ness’s credibility while, at the same time, it would have allowed the petitioner to
present crucial mitigating evidence.
Id.
319. 845 F.2d 610 (6th Cir. 1986).
320. Id. at 613. Under Ohio Rule of Evidence 804(B)(1), Allen was required to prove that
the absent witness was “unavailable” for trial. To satisfy his burden of proving the witness’s
unavailability, Allen’s trial counsel subpoenaed the witness’s probation officer as a defense
witness. The trial court stated that defense counsel had the burden of implementing independ-
ent efforts to locate the witness. Counsel advised the court of no independent efforts other than
issuing an “address unknown” subpoena for the witness to appear at trial. The court concluded
that defense counsel’s efforts were insufficient to demonstrate the witness’s unavailability and
excluded the transcript of his previous testimony. Id.
321. Id. at 615.
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mony denied him due process.322 The Allen court stated that the defendant’s
reliance upon the Supreme Court’s decisions in Chambers and Green,
wherein the court discussed a defendant’s constitutional right to present
evidence on his own behalf, was misplaced.323 The distinction between the
facts of Chambers and Green and the facts of Allen is readily apparent. In
Allen, the defendant was not precluded from introducing the exculpatory
evidence; rather, he was only required to comply with state evidentiary
rules in seeking its admission. In Chambers and Green, the exculpatory
evidence was excluded, and “no other avenues were available to prove the
defendant’s story.”324
Although Chambers, Green, Martin, and Allen support the author’s
proposition that if a capital defendant refuses the State’s examination, the
defense experts may be constitutionally excluded, another scholar may
disagree with this proposition. This scholar might suggest that even if the
defendant refuses the State’s examination, the jury should hear the defen-
dant’s experts’ testimony about their examination, testing, or evaluation
of the defendant.325
VI.   CONCLUSION
 A capital defendant is entitled to present mitigating evidence that
constitutes “a basis for a sentence less than death.”326 Defense mental
health testimony, based upon the examination of a defendant in the pen-
alty phase of a capital case, may be mitigating evidence that means the
difference between life and death. Such evidence may save a mentally im-
paired defendant from execution, or it may so distort the proportionality
of the factors involved in imposition of the death penalty that an unim-
                                                                                                         
322. Id.
323. Id. at 616.
324. Id. (stating that “[i]n other words, the defendants in Chambers and Green were de-
nied the opportunity to present exculpatory evidence, while the defendant in Allen was not”).
325. See, e.g., Sundby, supra note 265, at 1193. Professor Sundby suggests that a state
court’s procedural/evidentiary rules should not exclude relevant defense mitigation from the
jury; that the jury should hear such defense mitigation first and then the court, through its in-
structions, can tell the jury to reject such evidence. Id. In other words, Professor Sundby may
be suggesting that a sentencing jury should hear from the defendant’s experts who have exam-
ined him on the issue of mitigation, even if that defendant has refused the State’s reciprocal
examination. Based on this suggestion from Professor Sundby’s article, the court could give a
limiting instruction, but it could not totally exclude the evidence. Professor Sundby, however,
could not be suggesting that contrary to Chambers, Green, and their progeny, a penalty-phase
jury must hear evidence of questionable reliability, albeit given with an inefficacious evidence-
of-refusal instruction, which testimony is unexposed to effective cross-examination by the State
and which evidence is made all the more unreliable by the willful refusal of the accused to
make the evidence trustworthy by submitting to the State’s rebuttal examination.
326. Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 606 (1978) (concluding that the Eighth and Four-
teenth amendments require a sentencer to consider as a mitigating factor any aspect of a defen-
dant’s character or record, or any circumstance of his offense that the defendant proffers as
basis for a sentence less than death).
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paired serial killer escapes justice. Therefore, a correct determination of a de-
fendant’s degree of mental impairment depends upon admission of reliable
mental health testimony in the penalty phase. In cases in which the State
has had no opportunity for a rebuttal mental health examination, defense
mental health testimony is unreliable.
 The preclusion sanction ensures that the State can perform its own ex-
amination, which is the key to evidentiary reliability. Lesser alternative
sanctions to preclusion, such as limiting instructions, refusal instructions,
or contempt citations, are either constitutionally questionable, likely to be
misused by the capital sentencer, and/or incapable of giving the State a
fair opportunity to rebut the defense mitigation evidence. The preclusion
sanction ensures that 1) only reliable mental health evidence is used in
capital sentencing proceedings, and 2) a fair individual/State balance is
maintained.
Mental health testimony may be of questionable reliability. A penalty-
phase capital defendant’s mental health testimony that is based on an ex-
pert’s examination of the defendant is all the more unreliable when the
State’s experts are not given a right to examine the defendant. However,
Rule 3.202 ensures the reliability of any defense mental health testimony
by providing for the State’s own examination of the defendant. The Rule’s
preclusion sanction, or the threat of the preclusion sanction, is the only
effective sanction to ensure the State’s examination.
A capital defendant has an almost unlimited constitutional right, under
the Eighth and Fourteenth amendments, to present defense mental health
mitigation evidence in the penalty phase of a capital case. However, every
defendant, capital or otherwise, must comply with a state’s procedural
rules in presenting evidence. The United States Supreme Court has upheld
as constitutional the exclusion of defense evidence for failure to comply
with a state’s procedural or evidentiary rules. Although the Court also has
reversed cases in which the State has used its procedural rules to exclude
defense evidence in capital cases, the excluded evidence in those cases
was deemed reliable and trustworthy.
However, the preclusion sanction in Rule 3.202(e) excludes only un-
reliable defense evidence and only after a defendant has chosen to make
his evidence unreliable by refusing to be examined by the State’s experts.
Consequently, the use of the preclusion sanction is constitutional when a
court uses it to exclude a capital defendant’s penalty-phase expert testi-
mony in a case in which the defendant has refused the State’s compulsory
examination.
